The Impact of Historical Events on Politicization:
Quantitative Comparative Evidence from Western Europe, 1973-2002

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[*Draft*]

Although the literature largely agrees that "historical events"—unexpected, punctuated, and collectively experienced moments of political contingency—are important political socialization devices, empirical support for this contention is thin. So far, event effects have only been verified for a handful of political contingency instances and political attitudes. Against this backdrop, I reexamine the impact of historical events as political socialization factors by evaluating their long-term effects on everyday political engagement, a foundational political disposition. I test generational hypotheses that see these effects as positive, persistent, and stronger the more disruptive a political event was, and an original "diachronic" outlook that sees event effects as eroding over time, positive or negative depending on whether an event was divisive or unifying, and stronger the more effective it was in modifying state actions. I evaluate these sets of hypotheses by conducting a quantitative comparative analysis, the first to my knowledge, of event effects on a political attribute. Using 68 survey data points, I evaluate the impact of 34 concrete historical events on cohort levels of everyday political discussion in Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands from 1973 to 2002. I find supportive evidence for my diachronic expectations by evaluating the statistical association of levels cohort exposure to the events I analyze with political talk in 72 regressions per country. My findings suggest that events differ across them not in degree, but in the logic of their socializing influence, and underline their capacity to affect political traits beyond attitudes.

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INTRODUCTION

How does experiencing abrupt moments of political contingency—or "historical events"—shape people's political trajectories? Studying this question has long held disciplinary relevance as a vehicle to study the relationship between contingency and social change and role that history plays as a political socialization factor. And against the backdrop of unexpected populist victories, unexpected waves of protests, and political-sanitary COVID crises across the world, the study of this interrogation has also acquired renewed substantive saliency in current times.

Although the literature tends to agree in seeing historical events as capable of producing lasting effects in individual-level political attributes, we do not know with sufficient precision how differently and how much they persistently affect foundational political attributes. This gap in the literature is as much a consequence of the substantive focus of previous research on collective memory and issue positions as its analytical and theoretical choices, which have limited the conduction of comparative analyses on how events affect individual-level political characteristics.

In this investigation I seek to contribute to specific knowledge on how, how frequently, and how much can historical contingencies generate lasting cohort differences in political engagement. By doing so, I intend to make a set of inter-related theoretical, methodological, and substantive contributions.

Theoretically, going beyond the contention that "events matter" as devices for political socialization, I develop an original set of hypotheses on event effects. Departing

from "synchronic" generational theories that see event influences as permanent and generated mainly when an event occurs, my hypotheses take a "diachronic" outlook to event effects. This take posits that the politicizing influences of events update over time in interaction with ongoing political conditions and life cycle maturation processes. Based on this view, I propose that the effect that an event has on politicization fade with time, that its strength is associated with its capacity to lastingly change government action, and that its direction of influence is negative or positive depending on whether an event was polarizing or produced a rallying effect.

Analytically, I test these hypotheses by developing a comparative quantitative research framework to investigate event effects. This analytic approach begins by conducting in-depth historiographical research to identify empirical instances of "historical events" in a specific period and polity. For each of these events, it then generates a variable that captures the graded cohort influences on politicization under examination. Finally, it evaluates the statistical association of these variables with politicization in a way that controls for model selection uncertainty and cohort factors not related to event experiences. This design allowed me to use thirty years of survey data to evaluate the performance of twentieth-century historical events from Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands as predictors of frequency of political talk, an everyday behavioral measure of politicization and an important political conduct in an of itself.[1] This evaluation is based in the analysis of 72 regressions per country.

My results suggest that events are heterogeneous in the magnitude, direction, and robustness with which they persistently influence politicization. These heterogeneities' organization does not support generational hypotheses on event effects and align instead

[1] Political talk is important for processes of diffusion of political information, the formation of

with the diachronic outlook to event effects I introduce in this investigation. My findings show that the robustness of an event's association with political talk across the regressions I analyze is associated with its recency and its capacity to have generated lasting turnarounds in state action. They also suggest that the direction of events' influence on political engagement is associated with divisive or cohesive societal reactions to a historical event.

My investigation is organized into five sections. The first reviews the state of the literature on historical events' role as political socialization factors. The second identifies existing hypotheses on event effects on politicization, and introduce a new set of hypotheses on this influence. The third part discusses the research design and analytical strategy I used to test these hypotheses, and the fourth examines the results of my analysis. The concluding section recapitulates the paper's findings and contributions, and points to directions for future research.

HISTORICAL EVENTS AS POLITICIAL SOCIALIZATION DEVICES: WHAT WE KNOW, WHAT WE DON'T KNOW, AND HOW WE CAN KNOW BETTER

Most of what we know about how historical events persistently affect individual-level political attributes—an analytical outlook I will call "evenemential" (Sewell 1996)—comes from investigations that fall under the rubric of "generational research". The theoretical cornerstone of these works is *The Problem of Generations,* written by Karl Mannheim almost a hundred years ago (Mannheim 1952 [1927]). According to the dominant reading of this classic essay, in this text Mannheim proposes that the eruption of a historical contingency unleashes processes of "generational imprinting" in cohorts who are coming of age when they occur, making them develop political attributes connected with the specific characteristics of the contingency that is taking place.

Empirical findings supporting these processes date back to at least 1966, when Maurice Zeitlin found that the attitudes of working class Cuban men towards communism and the Cuban Revolution varied according to the political situations they experienced when they were young (Zeitlin 1966). In the seventies and eighties, the heyday of generational research, many other investigations began producing similar findings. Most of them came from research that investigated the political legacies of the sixties in the United States. These investigations found that people who entered adulthood in this decade carried distinctive political attitudes, which they associated to the historically turbulent context they came of age in. Two works from this line of inquiry stand out for their comprehensiveness. One is Jennings and Niemi's analysis of longitudinal data on the political attributes of 1965 high school seniors and their parents (Jennings and Niemi 1981). They explored how the political orientations of these young people evolved over time and how this variation diverged from their parents'. The other one is Delli Carpini's examination, using twenty-eight years of National Election Surveys (NES) data, of how the political characteristics of the "sixties generation" differed from the rest of the their fellow Americans (Delli Carpini 1986). Both works found that people who came of age during the sixties exhibited particularly distinctive characteristics related to subjects that organized the political debate during the sixties—for example, school desegregation.

Since the seventies, processes of generational imprinting have also been identified for party identification. In this decade, cohort-based analyses began to make use of repeated cross sectional data (typically, the NES surveys) to show that party adscription was patterned at least as strongly by birth year as by age, which was then the temporal factor most frequently used to understand people's partisan preferences (Glenn 1972; Abramson 1979). During this time, this body of work did not explicitly relate cohort patterns of partisanship

to differences in historical experiences, preferring instead to associate them with broader differences in "formative socializations" (Abramson 1976). But after the 1990s, cohort investigations on partisanship have started to relate more vocally cohort variations in this political orientation to differences in the historical occurrences they experienced during young adulthood (Osborne, Sears and Valentino 2011; Bartels and Jackman 2014; Ghitza and Gelman 2016).

Collective memory research has also generated results supporting generational imprinting processes. At the end of the eighties, Harold Schuman and Jacqueline Scott analyzed open-ended surveys that asked people to name the historical events they considred most important. Their investigation found that historical developments experienced during young adulthood were better remembered and more likely to be considered as particularly relevant (Schuman and Scott 1989). Since then, they and their colleagues have found similar findings in other national contexts (see Schuman and Corning 2012 for an overview; see also Griffin 2005).

The generational findings produced by investigations on political attitudes, partisanship, and collective memories have been key to establishing an agreement in the literature seeing historical events as important long-term devices for political socialization. Against the backdrop of the epistemological presentism that still tends to guide many instances of social research, this is no minor accomplishment. However, there are still important gaps in our knowledge of how experiencing a historical event affects political traits over time.

We still don't know much about how events affect political behaviors or foundational political attitudes related to politicization. So far, only Delli Carpini and Jennings and Niemi have investigated generational imprinting processes on factors

associated with political engagement. However, their findings do not converge. Delli Carpini found that members of the "sixties generation" exhibit lower levels of political interest. Jennings and Niemi's results, on the other hand, showed that people from these cohort segment have a higher sense of political efficacy and give more weight to politics than their parents (Delli Carpini 1986; Jennings and Niemi 1989).

Besides people that came of age during the sixties in the United States, we also don't know much of how historical events might affect people in other times and contexts. A large majority of generational investigations oriented to the analysis of political attitudes remain dedicated to the study of the "sixties generation" in the United States (Cutler 1974; Miller 1992; Jennings and Markus1984; Jennings 1996). This lack of diversity in research contexts impedes gauging whether the findings of these investigations can be generalized to other events, or if they are idiosyncratic of the historical experiences of the American sixties.

Finally, besides knowing that events "matter" politically for those who were coming of age when one occurred, more precise knowledge on how, how frequently, and how much they do so has yet to be produced. So far, the literature remains focused on verifying whether event effects exist rather than researching heterogeneities of political influence among them.

In light of this context, conducting a comparative investigation on the effects that events have on a foundational political attribute like politicization appears to be a productive direction of research, and should also serve as a motivation to address several analytical limitations in the way previous research has analyzed long-term event influences on individual-level political attributes.

First, because generational analyses seldom include controls related to the social characteristics of the times when people came of age, they cannot separate the effects of

processes of historical socialization related to *historical contingency* (i.e., events) from those associated merely with *historical context* (for example, relative influence; see Davis 1975; Inglehart 1981). A plausible explanation of the distinctiveness of the "sixties' generation" can be built as much around the historical ruptures it experienced during young adulthood as in connection with the social conditions that prevailed when they came of age—for example, increased affluence, or higher rates of educational attainment level.

Second, generational investigations have been lax in selecting the historical phenomena they use to test imprinting processes. Most voices in the literature—Mannheim included—agree that the specific historical entities that trigger these processes are punctuated, disruptive events (Mannheim 1952 [1927], 303, 310; Jennings 1984, 1001; Weil 1987, 309; Schuman and Scott 1989, 359; Delli Carpini 1989, 24). However, the generational literature evaluates imprinting processes in connection with very wide historical periods—like the "Italian fascism" or the "Weimar republic" periods (Barnes 1972; Weil 1987)—or with nebulous contexts of historical contingency—like the "dramatic historical occurrences" of the sixties (Jennings and Niemi 1981, 8). Research that takes a data-driven approach to investigate generational imprinting processes has done a better job in relating their analysis to specific political ruptures. However, the inductive way in which they identify them also poses analytic challenges: an "event" can be considered everything from the John F. Kennedy's murder (Schuman and Corning 2012) to a midterm election in the 1950s (Bartels and Jackman 2014).

Third, generational findings regularly stem from quantitative analyses where the imprinting capacity of an event is measured by a dummy of cohort exposure to an event that separates cohorts that came of age when it occurred from the ones that didn't. This analytical choice is convenient, but it is inevitably premised on assuming that only young

adults are historically sensitive. This contention is seldom explicitly discussed, commented, or justified. In fact, most generational investigations dedicate small time to theoretically discuss the imprinting process they research. They reference Mannheim's *The Problem of Generations* for more information, and rapidly proceed to conduct empirical analysis. However, because Mannheim's essay is not primarily concerned with discussing the socializing influences of historical events (DeMartini 1985), it does not provide a fully developed theory of how generational imprinting processes actually work. Currently, we lack a fully developed theory of how event effects originate and are sustained over time.

To sum up, in the current state of the literature, producing concrete and inferentially sound knowledge of event effects on politicization requires also giving sound theoretical foundations to the particular expectations on how political contingencies affect this behavior, and developing a comparative research design capable of robustly examining them empirically. I undertake the firs task in the next section and engage in the second in the one that follows.

THEORIES OF EVENT EFFECTS ON POLITICIZATION

As noted in the preceding section, the relevant literature has not yet produced conclusive results on whether historical events can persistently shape levels of politicization. I begin discussing theoretical outlooks to these influences by signaling two plausible arguments skeptic of them.

One of these arguments can be made by pointing out that life-cycle events and family and school political socialization processes tend to run largely independently from historical conditions. To the extent that these processes have been repeatedly found to be

key factors in shaping political engagement in the long run (Plutzer 2002; Neundorf, Smets and García-Albacete 2013; Smets 2016), one would not expect history to have a direct socializing force in terms of politicization.

A similar position can still be constructed even after recognizing historical forces as political socializers. This argument has also been articulated, sometimes in a surprisingly strong-worded way, by influential voices in the discipline of history. Fernand Braudel, a major figure of the Annales historiographical school, famously characterized events as "surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs" (Braudel 1980, 3). Within the literature on political socialization, Inglehart's post-materialist theory, which associates levels of political engagement with levels of social affluence when a generation came of age (Inglehart 1981, 884), echoes this skepticism —albeit in a more subtle manner—by suggesting that the main historical carriers of lasting political influences are socialization contexts, and not historical contingencies.

Generational research, on the other hand, posits that historical events exert lasting political influences for those who were young adults when they occurred, who at the time combined nascent political interest with lack of political experience. These investigations argue that when a historical event occurs, these "impressionable" citizens modify their political attributes in a manner that captures key characteristics of the political environment that the event produced (Mannheim 1952 [1927]; Weil 1987; Griffin 2005). Since historical events are moments of heightened political involvement (Sewell 1996; Wagner-Pacifici 2017), this outlook implies that a historical event increases political engagement for those who came of age when it occurred relative to other cohorts, and that these increases are larger the more intensely an event disrupted everyday social conditions or manifested in people's everyday experience when they were active.

These expectations are predicated on an outlook to event effects that sees their lasting political influence as a process constructed mainly synchronically. In this view, the cohort differences that events produced develop when an event is active, and once they are generated, they are assumed to continue unchanged and survive the passage of time. So far, this assumption has been given little discussion, but its viability can be associated with findings that personal memories from young adulthood are more vividly and more frequently rehearsed (Rubin 1998), and that memories from this life period tend to be perceived as being more important than others (Schuman and Scott 1989).

Still, it remains unclear how these vivid and personally important memories might be able to continuously shore up politicization levels as time goes by, against the backdrop of changing political conditions and the erosion of political engagement occurring along the life span. Although motivational resources for political engagement tend to remain stable, other resources for political engagement steadily erode once people reach adulthood. Individuals tend to undergo life events, like marriage and parenting, that reduce their investment in public-oriented matters (Kalmijn 2003; Stoker and Jennings 1995). After young adulthood, people's core interaction networks, where the bulk of political interaction occurs, also start to shrink (Wrzus et al. 2013; Marsden 2018). To these changes, steady decreases in political cognition and environmental sensitivity are added in in senior years (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). These processes suggest that event influences on cohort levels of politicization erode over time, making older events be less capable of shaping cohort levels of politicization.

Identifying event effects as processes of cohort differentiation that fade over time also allows to develop an outlook towards event effects less focused on what they synchronically provoked when they were active and more centered in the diachronic consequences they have over time in reducing or increasing the endowment of political

engagement resources for people, and of building historical conditions capable of slowing the decay of their influences.

An event's capacity to stay relevant as an organizing political issue, for example, might be able to extend the time span of its politicizing influence regardless of how intense it was when it occurred. A event that was powerful but no longer resonant with issues organizing political issues later on—for example, school desegregation after the sixties—might be less likely to sustain effective political engagement over time than an event that continues organizing contemporary political issues—for example, events that extended their resonance by having generated sweeping changes in state policy outlooks.[2]

A diachronic outlook to event effects on politicization also calls for revising the assumption that events exert only positive influences. Instead, it suggests that an event has positive or negative impacts on politicization depending on whether it was politically polarizing or "divisive", or produced a rallying effect that made it "cohesive". This argument is based on the recognition that strong influences that events have on young adults are not only cognitive but also structural.

Events increase political attention and multiply political interactions. When an event is divisive, these changes will ease people's ability to identify the ideological positions of the people they interact with. By doing so, they facilitate detecting ideological homophily. Since this trait is a key characteristic of political interactions, events perform as "subsidies", so to speak, for the generation of new steady political interaction partners (Noelle-Neumann 1993; Mutz 2002; Baldassarri and Bearman 2007). Young adults are particularly well equipped to capitalize on this opportunity. They stand in a structurally fluid biographical time when teenage ties are being substituted by new contacts with which they begin to build long lasting

[2] It is , of course possible, that historically dry events can nonetheless influence other important political attributes over time (Osborne, Sears, and Valentino 2011).

adult interaction networks (Bidart and Lavenu 2005). Under these conditions, the subsidy for political interaction ties that events generate provides young adults with an expanded pool of interaction partners. This will give them larger resources to start their adult political involvement, which will make them develop higher levels of political engagement relative to other cohorts that did not experience a political event during their coming of age. On the other hand, if an event is cohesive, we might expect the opposite situation. Relative to normal, uneventful times, the political interaction increases that stem from these types of events will obstruct the detection of political positions, hinder identifying political homophily, and hamper the development of political interaction networks in early adulthood.

Hypotheses.

Overall, the discussion above identifies three different sets of hypotheses on how events might persistently affect political engagement.

Two hypotheses contend that historical events are unable to exert lasting influences in politicization. One (H1) argues that since levels of political engagement are related primarily to family and life-event socialization processes that are independent of historical developments, we should not expect events to exert persistent influences on politicization. Another (H2) contends that we should not expect events to be associated with political engagement independently from the relationship between the affluence of a socializing context and political engagement:

> *H1: No historical effects.* Historical events are unable to generate persistent influences in political engagement.

> *H2: No evenemential effects.* When the positive relationship between a socializing context's affluence and political engagement is taken into account, historical events do not exert lasting influences in political engagement.

Generational investigations, on the other hand, see historical events as capable of impacting politicization in the long run. They take a synchronic outlook to understand these influences, seeing them as constructed mainly when an event is an ongoing political disruption. This view suggests that events positively impact cohort levels of politicization (H3a), that this impact is time resistant (H3b), and that the magnitude of its influence is associated with the intensity at which an event manifested itself on people's everyday experience when they occurred (H3c):

> *H3a: Positive cohort effects.* An event's occurrence makes the political engagement of cohorts that experienced it closer to young adulthood persistently larger than other cohorts'.
>
> *H3b: Permanent of effects.* The positive effects on politicization that events exert do not decay over time.
>
> *H3c: "Intensity" hypothesis.* The magnitude of the increases in politicization lasting effects that an event produces on political engagement is positively related to the strength at which it manifested as a political disruption when it occurred.

Finally, I offer a diachronic alternative set of hypotheses on event effects on politicization. It sees these capabilities as stemming not directly from what they did when they were active, but from how they relate to political conditions once they are no longer present. This

"recursive" approach to event effects sees them eroding over time (H4a), but argues that this erosion can be slowed down if an event manages to keep organizing political cleavages in the future—for example, if an event keeps resonating with state actions by having produced lasting sweeping changes in them (H4b). In light of the kind and strength of the structural changes that historical contingencies produce, it also contends that the direction of influence of an event on cohort levels of politicization will be positive or negative depending on whether it was divisive or cohesive (H4c):

> *H4a: Fading effects.* The more recent an event is, the more likely it will impact cohort levels of political engagement.
>
> *H4b: Polarization defines direction of influence.* Politically divisive events are associated with relative increases in politicization for cohorts that came of age when they occurred; cohesive contingencies, on the other hand, are associated with relative decreases.
>
> *H4c: "Effectiveness" determines magnitude of influence.* Historical events that produce sweeping changes in state action are more likely to keep exerting lasting cohort-level effects in political engagement.

RESEARCH DESIGN: DATA, SELECTION OF EVENTS, AND MEASUREMENT OF EVENT CHARACTERISTICS.

I evaluate the hypotheses above by evaluating the persistent impact that a theoretically built set of twentieth-century historical events from Belgium, France, West, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands had on the frequency with which people talk about politics from 1973 to 2002.

Data

The data I use comes from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend Dataset, which collects questions included at least five times in Eurobarometer surveys from July 1970 to April 2002. One such question is that to which I will refer to as "political talk": "when you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently (2), occasionally (1) or never (0)?" For Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the Mannheim Dataset includes *political talk* responses from sixty-eight different survey points spread over 29 years (1973-2002).[3] Eurobarometers collect information from people aged 15 and up, which allowed me to examine *political talk* responses for people in these countries born as early as 1900 and as late as 1985.[4]

As a preliminary inspection of how *political talk* varies by birth year, Table 1 shows cohort descriptive statistics for this variable. Cohorts from Belgium exhibit the lowest mean value of *political talk* (0.569) and those from West Germany the highest (0.906, a figure just below the "sometimes talking about politics" threshold). Consistent with findings from the literature (Bennet, Fischer and Resnick 1995; Bearman and Parigi 2004), these numbers show that people discuss about politics relatively infrequently.

[3] The time span, density, and distribution of the data I analyze is, at minimum, comparable to equivalent figures for recent long-term generational analyses (Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas 2011; Ghitza and Gelman 2014). Response values were renumbered for ease of interpretation.

[4] Appendix A shows the distribution of responses across cohorts. I excluded cohorts born before 1900 from the analysis since they were sampled at ages when being alive is closely associated with education and income, thus violating missing-at-random assumptions.

TABLE 1
POLITICAL DISCUSSION: COHORT DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS PER COUNTRY [1,2]

	Cross-Cohort Values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
1.—Belgium	.569	(.569)	.120	.794
2.—France	.748	(.748)	.350	.951
3.—West Germany	.906	(.906)	.444	1.063
4.—Italy	.772	(.772)	.454	.994
5.—Netherlands	.842	(.842)	.147	1.040

[1] Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend Dataset, 1973-2002.
[2] Values calculated from cohorts with 20 or more observations in the dataset

But how did cohort levels of political talk evolve across time beyond these static aggregate indicators? Is there any initial evidence of cohort patterns related to differential exposures to historical events?

I explore these questions with the help of the heat maps in Figures 1A and 1B, which plot *political talk* values across 2-year age/period cells. Cells from the same biennium are distributed along a single row, and cells across age are 11distributed across columns; in consequence, cells associated to a specific cohort are diagonally distributed. In Figure 4A, a cell is colored according to its mean *political talk* value relative to the all other cells; in Figure 4B, cells are similarly colored according to their within talkativeness relative to cells from the same biennium. Cells with higher means are colored with stronger shades of red and those with lower values are colored with darker tones of green; cells with a small sample of respondents (n<20) are shown in gray.

FIGURE 1A
POLITICAL DISCUSSION VALUES ACROSS TIME
COLOR HISTOGRAM, 1973-2002



[1] Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend Dataset, 1973-2002.
[2] Values calculated from cohorts with 20 or more observations in the dataset

FIGURE 1B
POLITICAL DISCUSSION VALUES ACROSS TIME
COLOR HISTOGRAM BY 2-YEAR PERIOD, 1973-2002



[1] Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend Dataset, 1973-2002.
[2] Values calculated from cohorts with 20 or more observations in the dataset

Figure 1A shows that *political talk* changes according to environmental conditions. For instance, in Italy its values shifted from moderate figures during the 1980s to maximum figures in the beginning of the 1990s, when the country was shaken by massive corruption scandals, high profile terrorist acts associated with the mafia, and the collapse of its postwar political system –often informally known as the "First Republic" (Gundle and Parker 1996).

Figure 1B, on the other hand, shows that net of historical contexts, *political talk* levels are also organized by cohorts. Cells that exhibit biennial peak values of this variable are diagonally organized, indicating a noticeable stability of cohort rankings of political discussion. Cohorts that exhibit high levels of *political talk* when they were young relative to others tend to keep doing so later on. On the other hand, those that came of age exhibiting low values of *political talk* remain being relatively silent.[5] Figure 1B also shows that cohorts that are either frequent or infrequent talkers reached adulthood when major political contingencies occurred. In Italy, people that came of age during the collapse of the First Republic keep being frequent political talkers later on. By contrast, cohorts that came of age during the first years of the eighties, when several powerful terrorist attacks occurred in the country (Tota 2003), were infrequent political talkers then and continued being so over time.

Overall, these trends provide initial supporting evidence that historical events can modify cohort levels of *political talk* and motivate conducting an explicit examination of how experiencing moments of historical contingency are associated with cohort levels of political talk, and how these associations relate to the hypotheses I identified in the previous section.

I conduct this analysis by identifying the set historical contingencies that the cohorts included in my data experienced in the countries I analyzed, generating cohort variables of

[5] Uniform age patterns in relative values of *political talk* by period are limited to adolescence and the oldest seniors. People located in these life periods are the ones that talk the least about politics.

historical exposure to each of them, and evaluating the performance of these variables of *political talk*.

Identification of Events and Event-Level Characteristics

I conducted an in-depth historiographical revision of the twentieth-century history for the countries under analysis to identify which historical occurrences to include in my investigation, and to gauge several characteristics relevant to the hypotheses I seek to test.

My investigation was oriented at detecting historical instances connected to the notion of "historical event" recently advanced by historical sociology as an abrupt, widespread, and collectively experienced political contingency (Sewell 1996; Wagner-Pacifici 2017). I identified an occurrence forming part of these instances if it was described as an unforeseen political development that abruptly provoked major discontinuities in the political environment of a country, or if it provoked sudden shifts in people's everyday relationship with politics. Overall, I was able to identify events in in 43 contiguous "eventful" years between 1918, when the first cohort under analysis came of age, and April 2002, when the last Eurobarometer survey from my data was conducted.

Some of these periods include political contingencies that originated in social mobilizations (e.g. the May '68 protests in France [Bavard 2008]). In addition to these occurrences, which have been the type of events more frequently investigated by previous research, the periods I identified also feature contingencies associated with electoral processes (for example, the 1948 General Election campaign in Italy [Novelli 2008]); government crises (e.g., the 1978 breakup of the Egmont Pact in Belgium [Brassine and Mabille 1978]); terrorist acts (e.g., the bombing of the Bologna train station in 1980 [Oliva 2019]), corruption and state malpractice scandals (e.g., the Agusta Affair in Belgium [Barrez

1998]); and contingent periods of diverse origins, such as the political emergencies provoked by the Germany's failure to keep up with war reparation payments in 1923 (Maier 1975).

Ten of these eventful periods occurred in Belgium, 8 in France, 13 in West Germany, 7 in Italy, and 5 in the Netherlands. Figure 2 shows the temporal location of these eventful years and a name referencing the events that occurred in them.[6] For ease of exposition I will refer to these evenemential periods as "events"; to refer to a specific period, I will use the name of the political contingency(es) that occurred in it. Appendix B provides a selected bibliography for the contingencies events that occurred in each of these period.

I also used my historiographical research to identify synchronic characteristics related to how intensely an event manifested in everyday reality when it occurred, and to diachronic characteristics related to its recency and the changes, if any, it exerted on state action. (For specific figures for these estimates for each of the events I analyze, refer to Appendix B).

As indicators of an event's intensity, I generated indicators of their duration, narrative diversity, political disruptiveness, and experiential strength.

I measured an event's duration by counting the months spanning between its "beginning"—the major political disruption that originated an event—and its "end"—the moment when the political incertitude it produced was put under control. For instance, the duration of the Spring '68 events in France was two months: May and June '68.[7]

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[6] Several events spanned multiple years. In these cases, the year of an event's occurrence was assigned to the one that included the largest part of the event's life as a major political contingency. The year of occurrence of the 1991 "Black Sunday" in Belgium, for example, was assigned to 1992 because the election was held in November and most of its political effects took place in that year (Mabille and Brassine 1992).

[7] On May 2, left-wing students from the Nanterre campus of the University of Paris, located at the outskirts of the city, relocated their protests to the Latin Quarter in downtown Paris. Their actions led to the unprecedented closure of the University cloister and a violent eviction of protesters from university premises, which soon degenerated into large-scale street confrontations between police and students. This contentious period ended in June, when de Gaulle obtained a sweeping electoral victory that politically neutralized the massive protests and strikes that had taken place since May (Pavard 2018; Vigna and Vigreux 2008).

Appendix B reports events' duration and the historical occurrences associated with their start and nd points. While they are degree arbitrary to a degree, they are connected to the period in which an event, in the words of Robin Wagner Pacifici (2017: 1358),"forced their way into subjects' field of attention."

FIGURE 2
VARIABLES OF HISTORICAL EXPOSURE TO EVENTS[1]

Temporal Location



Period Event Instances

Belgium

1.— '36. First Black Sunday, Summer strikes.
2.— '50. Abdication of Leopold III.
3.— '55. Collard Law protests.
4.— '60. Intervention in Congo; Winter strikes.
5.— '68. Leuven University Split crises.
6.— '78. Egmont Pact breakdown.
7.— '80-'81. Events from the *Redresesement* period: Federalization crises ('80); Political-Economic crises ('81); First Peace March ('81).
8.— '83. Second Peace march.
9.— '92. Second Black Sunday and Martens downfall.
10.— '95-'96. Agusta-Dassault Corruption Affair ('95); Marc Dutroux Affair & White March ('96).

France

1.— '34.-'36. Events from the Popular Front development period: Anti-Parliamentary Riot ('34) Unitary Rally ('35); Popular Front Victory & Summer strikes ('36).
2.— '47. Tripartite Government Fall and Strikes, Establishment of Gaullist Front.
3.— '54. Dien Bien Phu & Indochina Retreat
4.— '58. First Algiers Putsch and Establishment of Fifth Republic.
5.— '61-'62. Algerian crises: Referendum on Algerian Independence, OAS Terrorism (First Wave); Second Algiers Putsch; Repression of Algerian and Left-Wing Protests ('61); Évian
6.— Agreements, OAS Terrorism (Second Wave), De Gaulle Murder Attempt ('62).
6.— '68. Spring '68 Events.
7.— '81. Socialist Electoral Victories.
8.— '83. *Tournant de la Rigueur:* economic reform policies.

[1] See Appendix B for selected bibliography and further information on the events

FIGURE 2 (CONT.)
VARIABLES OF HISTORICAL EXPOSURE TO EVENTS

Event Instances
West Germany
1.— '18-'20. Events from the German Revolution period: Capitulation, January Strikes, and Second Reich Downfall Events ('18)[2]; January Uprising, Freikorps Campaigns, Dissolution of Councils & Weimar Constitutive Assembly ('19); Kapp Putsch and Ruhr Uprising ('20).
2.— '23. War Reparation Crises.[3]
3.— '30. Federal Election Results.
4.— '32-'33. Events from the Weimar Republic downfall period: National Concentration Cabinet crises ('32); Reichstag Fire and Enabling Acts ('33).
5.— '48-'49. Events from the Federal Republic Establishment period: End of Blockade & Economic Reintegration ('48); Establishment of Federal Republic ('49).
6.— '61-'62. Berlin Partition ('61); Spiegel Affair ('62).
7.— '67-'68. Summer and Emergency Law Protests.
8.— '72. RAF Terrorist Acts; *Ostpolitik* Political Crisis.
9.— '77. RAF Terrorism: Stammheim Offensive.
10.—'81. Euromissile Mobilizations, Corruption Scandals.
11.—'83. Events from the Wende Period; Flick Commission; Nuclear Action Week; Helmut Schmidt Downfall.
12.—'90. Reunification.
13.—'00. CDU Financing Scandal.
Italy
1.— '18-'20. Events from the *Biennio Rosso* period: Strikes, Fiume Occupation Crises, General Election Results, ('18-'19); Social Violence Events ('20).[4]
2.— '22. Legalitarian Strike and March on Rome.
3.— '48. General Election, Strikes.
4.— '68-'70. Events from the *Maggio Strisciante* period: *Sessantotto* Protests and Labor Strikes ('68); *Autunno Caldo* ('69); Piazza Fontana Attack & Aftermath ('70).
5.— '76-'78. Events from the *Anni di Piombo* period: Lockheed Scandal, General Election ('76); Lockhed Commission; '77 Movement & Terrorist Acts ('77); Aldo Moro Murder ('78).
6.— '80. Bologna Station Attack; Donat-Cattin Scandal.
7.— '92-'94. Events from the 'First Republic' Dissolution period: *Mani Pulite* Inquiry; Falcone & Borsellino Murders, Mafia Terrorism ('92); Cusani Trial; Amato Resignation, Technocratic Gov't ('93); *Discesa in Campo,* Berlusconi's electoral victory and resignation ('94).
Netherlands
1.— '33-'34. *Die Zeven Provinciën* Mutiny ('33); Jordaan Riot ('34)
2.— '46-'48. Indonesian Crises: Linggajatti Agreements & Conscription Protests ('46); First Indonesian Police Action ('47); Second Indonesian Police Action ('48).
3.— '76-'77. Lockheed Affair ('76); Glimmen Train Hostage Crisis, Gov't Formation Crisis ('77)
4.— '81. Euromissile Dissensus.
5.— '83. *Keerpunt* and Second Peace March.

[2] Capitulation; Kiehl Mutiny; Reich Downfall (Wilhelm II abdication, Workers' Councils, December Coups).
[3] Ruhr Occupation, Passive Resistence, and Cuno Strikes; Bavaria State Commission; Dissolution of Communist Governments in Saxony and Thuringia, and Hamburg Uprising, Küstrin Coup, Beer Hall Coup.
[4] Ancona Mutiny; Factory Occupations; Fascist Squads and Palazzo Accursio Massacre; Siege of Fiume.

I also generated a measure of an event's narrative diversity by counting the number of separate sequences of political disruptions that an event generated. The French '68, for example, features three such sequences: the student protests of May and June; the wildcat strikes (and later on, union-backed) and negotiations between the government and unions that led to the signature of Grenelle labor agreements on May 27; and the political crisis provoked by the erosion of president Charles De Gaulle's control of the political agenda and the increasingly visible polarization regarding his permanence as president through May and June, which came abruptly to an end after his landslide electoral victory at the end of that month.[8]

An additional indicator of an event's intensity concerns its political disruptiveness. I counted the number of governments that fell in the eventful periods I investigated. The French '68 carries one such fall: the resignation of Georges Pompidou as Prime Minister in reaction to the strains that the May and June protest episodes provoked in his relationship with president De Gaulle.[9]

As a fourth and last measure of how strongly an event manifested in people's experiences, I generated an indicator distinguishing various degrees of experiential intensity: a "mild" one indicating disruptions constrained mainly to the formal domain of politics a "moderate" one for contingencies that impinged directly in everyday experiences either in the form of economic crises or latent violence, as in the case of large waves of terrorist acts;

[8] The minimum number of disruptive sequences of an event was one. The maximum is seven, pertaining to the French Algerian Crises of 1961 and 1962—see Appendix B.

[9] The formation of a new government following a regular election, or one headed by the prime minister and coalition that governed previously was not coded as a government fall. 22 events did not provoke government changes. The period related to the development of the Popular Front in France (1934-1936) witnessed the fall of six governments, the maximum number in the event set (Jackson 1985; see Appendix B).

and a "high" one for disruptions associated with a more generalized collapse of the rule of law.[10]

As a last measure of an event's strength, I also categorized events according to the "type" of politically disruption they were most importantly associated with: insurrections, terrorist acts, protests and strikes, corruption and mal practice scandals, political crises (including decolonization), elections, and period of contingency related to more than one type of events. Most events fall into this latter category.

I also identified two characteristics relevant to the diachronic set of hypotheses I introduced. One was the recency of an event (measured through the year at which it happened), and the other was an indicator of how relevant it remained after its occurrence, which I measured by evaluating whether it had provoked comprehensive turnarounds in state structures or in the orientations of its policies.[11]

METHODS

General Analytical Strategy

I study event effects on politicization, first, by analyzing how variables of cohort exposure to the set of historical events I identified above perform as regressors of *political*

[10] An example of a "mild" event is the breakup of the Egmont pact (Brassine and Mabille 1978). It unexpectedly put to an end a political agreement on the federalization of Belgium but had few tangible implications in citizens' everyday lives. Events of "moderate" experiential intensity include, for example, the Autumn '77 terrorist acts conducted by the RAF in West Germany (Wunschick 1997). The events from the *Biennio Rosso* period, on the other hand, are an example of contingencies whose experiential intensity was coded as "high" (Maier 1975).

[11] An example of the first type of event is the German Revolution of 1918 (Ryder 2008); of the second, the 1936 Popular Front, which generated lasting labor reforms (Jackson 1985); and of the third, the Federalization crises of 1980, which finally reorganized the Belgian state along linguistic lines (Brassine 1980). I excluded the First Algiers Putsch and the Nazi Power takeover in Germany ('32-'33) from being understood as influential events due to the processes of collective memory suppression that have been documented for them (Harbi and Stora 2004, Lüdtke 1993; Kansteiner 2004).

talk between 1973 and 2002, and second, by evaluating how this performance varied across events sharing different characteristics.[12]

The age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem is often voiced as a concern for the conduction of cross-sectional approaches to study temporal social dynamics. This concern stems from the fact that separate effects of age, period, and cohort influences cannot be reliably calculated because these three temporal concepts are perfectly collinear (Mason, Mason and Poole 1973). However, this problem is operative only if age, period and cohort effects are assumed to be linear, monotonic (consistently growing or decreasing in value), and independent. These assumptions have not been theoretically defended and are at odds with key empirical findings and theoretical postulates from the literature.[13] Hence, similar to other recent studies on historical socialization (Bartels and Jackman 2014: 8), I do not see the APC identification problem as a inferential threat to my investigation.

An inferential issue that is more relevant for my cohort relates to potential omitted variable bias at the cohort level, which is pervasive in generational research studies. To assess this issue, I included measurements of cohort-level factors other than evenemential exposure as regressors of *political talk* in my analysis.

Another relevant inferential issue is related to model selection uncertainty, which warns against deriving conclusions from a single regression due to ignorance of the "true" causal model (Young 2009). This warning is specially relevant for investigations like mine, that has few precedents in the literature. Being, to my knowledge, the first quantitative

[12] Since events are political disruptions bounded to country-specific context, conducted separate analysis for each country. This separate analysis also allowed controlling for country-specific idiosyncrasies in political communicative practices.

[13] Assuming linearity in age goes against systematic findings of an inverted-u relationship between age and political engagement. In addition, the absence of a progressive or regressive trend in the temporal distribution of the events I analyze also makes the cohort "effects" unlikely to be linearly organized. From a broader epistemological standpoint, presentist social research is actually implicitly predicated on the premise that a period "affects" different people in different ways.

comparative analysis of event effects, there are no previous results with which to compare my results. Against this backdrop, my investigation addresses model selection uncertainty by evaluating how events performed as predictors of *political talk* in 72 different regressions models for each country under analysis. The analysis of my results are based in cross-regressions parameters that measure the magnitude, direction of influence and significance—or "robustness" of their performance as regressors of *political talk* across this regression set.

Dependent Variable and Model Specification

The dependent variable is *political talk,* an ordinal covariate with three different values: never (0), occasionally (1), and frequently (2).[14]

Sociological research has typically examined ordinal variables like this one using ordered logistic models. However, since my investigation analyzes multiple regressions, using these models is less recommendable because estimates from ordered logistic regressions cannot be compared across models due to unobserved heterogeneity (Mood 2010; Allison 2009).[15] As an alternative, recent methodological pieces have suggested using linear models. Their estimated coefficients are unbiased and consistent, and their substantive results, understood in terms of average estimated effects, have been found to be nearly identical to those from logistic models (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018, 49-50; Mood 2010, 78). Following these recommendations, I use linear models to regress *political talk*. To control for heteroskedasticity, I used robust standard errors to calculate models' estimates. (I conducted analysis on the statistical significance of regressors using ordered logistic regressions as a

[14] Total responses number 70,577, from which only 393 (0.5%) were missing values. Although the question is restricted to engagement in political talk with friendships, research indicates a significant part of political talk occurs among friends (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).

[15] These pieces develop their argument for logistic models, but the logic of their discussion applies equally to ordered logistic models (Mood 2010, 79).

robustness check. The results of this analysis, reported in Appendix D1, are similar to the ones I center my analysis on).

Key Independent Variables

The key independent variables capture cohort-level differentials in historical sensitivity to each of the events I analyze. I will refer to them as "event variables". I also generated variables of cohort exposure to the First and Second World Wars. Although not properly events due to their long duration, their importance for twentieth-century European history provided a compelling reason to include them in the analysis.[16]

The literature currently models variables of historical exposure dichotomously, giving a value of 1 to cohorts belonging to the "generation" that came of age when an event happened and a zero value to cohorts that did not. This construction captures the distinctiveness of young adulthood as a period of heightened historical sensitivity, but it is insensitive to the gradual, not abrupt, way in which this attribute diminishes in value across cohorts from younger and older ages (Galaz-García 2020).

I take into account the graded form of this decrease by modeling an event variable as bell-shaped curve skewed towards cohorts that came of age when the event happened using the following exponential formula:

$$
\begin{aligned}
sensitivity_{i(k),j(k)} = 100 \quad & if \ coh^{*}_{j(k)} = coh_{i(k)} \ ; \\
100*\exp[-6.0a*(coh^{*}_{j(k)} - coh_{i(k)})]^2 \quad & if \ coh^{*}_{j(k)} < coh_{i(k)} \ ; \\
100*\exp[-0.3a*(coh^{*}_{j(k)} - coh_{i(k)})]^2 \quad & if \ coh^{*}_{j(k)} > coh_{i(k)} \ ,
\end{aligned}
\qquad (1)
$$

[16] The Netherlands did not participate in the First World War. I did not assign variables of exposure to World War I for Germany and Italy either because 1918 was also associated to the German Revolution and the dissolution of the Liberal political system, respectively.

where $sensitivity_{i(k),j(k)}$ indicates the degree of historical sensitivity of individual *i* to the *j*-th event in country *k*, $coh*_{j(k)}$ is the birth year of the cohort aged 20 when the *j*-th event happened, and $cohort_{i(k)}$ is the birth year of individual *i*.[17]

With this formula, cohorts that experienced a political contingency during young adulthood receive values in the vicinity of 100. They decrease rapidly and then more slowly until reaching near-zero levels for the oldest and youngest living cohort at the moment when an event erupted and for people not yet born at that time. To preserve causal precedence, the values for each of these variables of event exposure were set to zero for responses from surveys conducted before the occurrence of an event.

The *a* coefficient defines the width of the bell. I analyzed the performance of events as regressors of *political talk* using four different widths: a=0.004, a=0.006, a=0.008, and a=0.010) The amplitude of the cohort segment with values larger than 90 in each of these bell widths was 11, 8, 7, and 6 years, respectively.

Figure 3 shows the shape of these variables across cohorts using the '68 French Spring as an example. This event variable peaks at 100 for people born on 1948, who were aged 20 when it occurred. Cohorts that experienced Spring '68 around this age exhibit values that are only marginally smaller to 100. The values for the variable decrease at a relatively fast pace and then at a slower speed for the youngest and oldest cohorts.

[17] The choice to center the bell of these variables on cohorts aged 20 when an event occurred was made because this age starts to exhibit adulthood maturation processes while still being close to the transition from adolescence to young adulthood.

FIGURE 3
EVENT SENSITIVITY VARIABLES[1]

Example: Spring 1968, France

1.— Functional Forms of Sensitivity Variables



2.— Values across Time/Age Space
a = 0.004



Controls

Cohort-level controls. I include as regressors measurements of cohort-level factors that have been discussed as influential for politicization: the size of the population of a cohort (Ryder 1965: 845-846), and the relative affluence of the period when it came of age (Inglehart 1981). There are no readily-available data series to measure the size or the level of educational attainment for the 80 cohorts of the 5 countries I analyze. I constructed this series using a variety of historical statistical sources that allowed me to produce minimally consistent measures of cohort size and educational attainment for these cohorts. Appendix C discusses how these data series were constructed.[18]

I measured *cohort size* as the number of people (in thousands) aged between 15 and 20 when a cohort was aged 18. As an indicator of the affluence of a cohort's socialization environment I used its *educational attainment* level, measured as the proportion of university students or graduates among people aged between 15 and 25 when a cohort was 18 years old.

In addition, to control for other cohort-related factors that could potentially affect *political talk,* I also included dummy variables indicating that a respondent was added into a particular 5-year *cohort category*. The reference category was the first cohort bracket included in the analysis.

Period-Level Controls. To test the impact of elections on political talk (Sears and Valentino 1997), I included a dummy variable indicating general *election* years. I also included yearly GDP per capita growth rates to test the strength of association between *political* discussion and *economic performance.*

[18] It is likely that *cohort size* and *cohort education* exhibit measurement errors. However, they are expected to be randomly distributed for *cohort size,* and to yield conservative estimates for *cohort education.*

Individual-Level Controls. I included variables indicating *age*, *income, education*, *female* identification and *marital status* as individual-level controls. These factors have been previously associated with political discussion (Marsden 1987; Moore 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Bearman and Parigi 2004). Following standard findings from the literature, I included age using a quadratic specification. I measured education through categorical dummies indicating maximum educational attainment: incomplete high school, complete high school, incomplete college, incomplete college, and ongoing studies.[19] I included income through five categorical dummies associated with monotonically increasing earing brackets, measured in 2002 real value local currencies, and another one indicating non-response. The reference categories for these variables were people with incomplete higher education and the lowest income bracket.

I also included *urban* and *metropolitan* residence indicators[20] and dummies indicating the region of residence of a respondent—for each country, the reference category was its most industrialized region. Except for *income,* for which I generated a non-response indicator, no variable exhibited evidence of violating missingness-at-random assumptions.

Set of Regressions under Analysis and Regressors' Parameters of Performance

To control for model selection uncertainty, I evaluate the performance of event variables as regressors of *political talk* across 72 regressions per country. Each included an invariable vector containing all period, event exposure, and individual- level controls, and a

[19] Eurobarometers do not provide direct information on respondents' maximum educational attainment; I use the age at which a respondent left school as an indicator to generate indicators of attainment related to 4 categories that ranged from not having finished junior high school (1) to having completed college studies (4), plus a fifth indicating continuing education. I included *income* through five categorical dummies associated with monotonically increasing income brackets, measured in 2002 real value local currencies, and a sixth indicating non-response.

[20] The metropolitan residence indicator distinguishes inhabitants of cities with a urban core exceeding a million inhabitants (Paris, West Berlin, Rome and Amsterdam) from the rest of the population.

specific permutation of event variables of a particular width (a=0.004, 0.006, 0.008, and 0.0010), specifications for *cohort educational attainment* (absence, linear, or quadratic specifications), *cohort size* (absence, linear, or quadratic specification), and *cohort dummies* (presence or absence).

My analysis evaluates regressors' magnitude, direction and significance—or "robustness"—of influence across these models by examining several cross-regression parameters of performance.

Following Young and Holsteen (2017), I analyzed the magnitude and direction of influence of an independent variable by calculating the mean value and standard deviation of its estimated coefficients. I used these parameters to gauge the strength of association between an event and *political talk* and evaluate if it was "robustly" unidirectional—that is, if the distribution of these values was negative or positive at standard significance levels.

I evaluated robustness of influence by calculating covariates' significance rates (SRs), or the proportion of regressions at which their estimated coefficients were significant at standard levels of confidence. Using this value, and drawing from Ragin's discussions on causal sufficiency tests (2000), I also developed a statistic, which I call the "robust significance" estimate, that calculates the probability that a variable would be significant in 75% of more of possible regression specifications using the following z-value test:

$$z_{sig} = \frac{(RS - p) - (1/[2(n))}{[p(1-p))/n]^2} \qquad (2)$$

where *RS* refers to the rate of significance, *n* refers to the number of models in the regression set (72 for my analysis), and *p* refers to the benchmark rate of significance, which,

following Ragin (2000), was set at $p = 0.75$.[21] The values of this test range from 0 to 1, and its logic of interpretation is the same as a standard *p*-value. I will refer to variables exhibiting test values below 0.1 as robustly significant predictors of political talk.

FINDINGS

I begin by exploring summary results for control variables. Table 2 shows the direction and range of variation of estimated effects[22] for individual- and period-level controls that exhibited robust significance and directionality.

Overall, their performance as predictors of *political talk* is consistent with previous literature. The *education* brackets and the *female* and electoral year indicators impact *political talk* significantly and in the same direction in all countries (with an exception for *election* in West Germany). *Education* brackets are the single most important predictors of *political talk*. They are positively related with this behavior: higher levels of education attainment are associated with higher levels of *political talk*.

Income also exhibits a generally positive association with *political talk,* although there are several exceptions to this trend. In West Germany and the Netherlands, middle income brackets are associated with less political talk than the lowest earning bracket. The relationship between *political talk* and age, on the other hand, follows an inverted-u relationship: political discussion increases until reaching a peak in mature adulthood and it then decreases.[23] Being identified as a woman, on the other hand, is negatively associated

[21] *Cohort size* and *cohort educational attainment* were included in their linear or quadratic form in less than thirty regressions. Accordingly, robust significance tests for them were conducted using a negative binomial probability tests.

[22] The estimated coefficients and rate of significance for specific categorical indicators is reported in Appendixes D2 and D3. Appendix D3 also reports results for regional controls.

[23] In Belgium, the inflection point of this quadratic curve occurs at late age, which makes the relationship between age and *political discussion* increase monotonically between 15 up to 80 years.

TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF META-ANALYTIC RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL AND PERIOD CONTROLS

	Variation of effects (if significant)[1]							
	Individual-level controls						Period Controls	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Countries	Educ.[3]	Income[4]	Age	Female	Rural	Married	Election	ΔGDP
1.— Belgium	.446	.183	.392	.195	.027	N/S	.016	.059
Direction[2]:	(+)	(+)	(+)	(–)	(–)	.	(+)	(+)
2.— France	.461	.256	.218	.147	.049	.027	.020	.076
Direction:	(+)	(+)	(quad.)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(+)	(+)
3.— West Germany	.306	.083	N/S	.208	.026	.040	N/S	.088
Direction:	(+)	(+/–)	.	(–)	(–)	(+)	.	(–)
4.— Italy	.420	.173	.406	.300	.028	.027	.013	N/S
Direction:	(+)	(+)	(quad.)	(–)	(+)	(–)	(+)	.
5.— Netherlands	.389	.302	.143	.057	.012	.037	.047	.049
Direction:	(+)	(+/–)	(quad.)	(–)	(–)	(+)	(+)	(–)

[1] Difference between the largest and the smallest statistically significant average estimated coefficient. N/S: Robust Significance Indicator not significant at standard confidence levels

[2] (–): monotonically negative relationship; (+): monotonically positive relationship; (–/+): relationship includes positive and negative variations; (quadr): quadratic relationship.

[3] Reference category: lowest-earning bracket.

[4] Reference category: incomplete high school.

with political discussion in all the countries under analysis. The magnitude of this relationship changes notoriously: in Italy, for example, it is almost six times larger than in the Netherlands. Residence in *rural* areas is also a negative predictor of political talk, but the strength of this association is small.[24]

The influence of *marriage* on *political talk,* on the other hand, varies by country. Its effect is not significant in Belgium, negative in Italy and France, and positive in West Germany and the Netherlands.

[24] Italy is an exception: living in a rural area is positively related to *political talk*.

With respect to period controls, the association between *political talk* and an *election* year is also positive, but its magnitude is also small. The relationship between *economic performance* and *political talk*, on the other hand, is positive but small in Belgium and France, not significant in Italy, and small and negative in Germany and the Netherlands.

After exploring the results for controls, I now proceed to discuss how cohort-level controls performed as predictors of *political talk*. Table 3 shows average estimated coefficients and significance rates for *cohort education* in their linear and square specifications (column 1 and columns 2 and 3, respectively). Columns 4 to 6 present equivalent parameters for *cohort size*.

Coefficients for *cohort size* were marginal in magnitude and very rarely significant. Estimated coefficients for cohort levels of educational attainment, on the other hand, performed better as predictors of *political talk*. In Italy, terms from the quadratic specification of *cohort educational attainment* were robust in magnitude and significance, as were linear specifications in the Netherlands and France.[25] In Belgium, the magnitude of coefficients are robust in magnitude but their SRs are not significant. Germany is the only country where *cohort education* performed poorly as a predictor of political talk. Only the linear term of the quadratic specification exhibits estimated coefficients that are robust in both magnitude and significance.

The direction of the association between cohort educational attainment and *political talk* however is in the opposite direction of postmaterialist research: people from cohorts with larger share of college graduates tend to talk *less,* not more, about politics. The only

[25] In the Netherlands, the terms for the quadratic specification were also significant, but the linear term was significant only in half of the regressions under analysis. This suggests that a relationship between cohort education and political talk might more likely be linear.

TABLE 3
META-ANALYTIC RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS[1]

	Cohort Education Attainment			Cohort Size		
	Lin. Spec.	Quad. Specification		Linear Spec.	Quadratic Specification	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Countries	Linear Term	Linear Term	Square Term	Linear Term	Linear Term	Square Term
1.— Belgium						
Est. Coeff.[1]	-0.121	1.140**	-2.151*	-6.07e-4	1.93e-4	2.85e-7
Sig. Rate[2]	*0.375*	*0.708*	*0.625*	*0.625*	*0.292*	*0.292*
2.— France						
Est. Coeff.	-0.913***	-0.385	-0.905	-1.27e-5	-2.17e-4	2.99e-8
Sig. Rate	*1.000***	*0.291*	*0.500*	*0.291*	*0.250*	*0.292*
3.— West Germany						
Est. Coeff.	-0.562*	-0.883***	0.680	-7.26e-7	6.31e-6	-8.72e-10
Sig. Rate	*0.750*	*1.000***	*0.041*	*0.083*	*0.167*	*0.167*
4.— Italy						
Est. Coeff.	-0.162	1.952***	-4.319***	-7.16e-5	-7.53e-5	1.33e-10
Sig. Rate	*0.583*	*1.000***	*1.000***	*0.833*	*0.167*	*0.208*
5.— Netherlands						
Est. Coeff.	-0.864***	-0.298*	-2.500***	1.55e-4*	-2.21e-4	1.82e-7
Sig. Rate	*1.000***	*0.500*	*0.916***	*0.708*	*0.208*	*0.208*

Significance: +0.1 level; * 0.05 level; ** 0.01 level; 0.001 level.
[1] Significance levels show if the distribution of values were unidirectional at stadard levels of confidence.
[2] Significance levels from Robut Significance Indicator: probability that of a variable being significant in at least 75% of models given observed sigificance rate.

exception is Italy. In this country, the quadratic relationship between *cohort education* and *political talk* produces mostly increases across cohort levels of educational attainment.

Indicators of adscription to 5-year cohort categories tended to be not significant, with exceptions of one cohort bracket for Belgium (b. 1906-1910) and West Germany (b. 1921-1925), and four contiguous dummies in Italy (b. 1941-1960; see Appendix D4).[26]

[26] Significant birth year indicators are 1906-1910 for Belgium; 1921-1925 for West Germany; and the four indicators between 1946 and 1960 for Italy.

After this brief discussion of results for controls, I now proceed to discuss results for event variables.[27]

On average, events were significant regressors of *political talk* in little more than half of the regressions under analysis (SR= 0.605), A large standard deviation (0.326), however, indicates there exists wide variations from this figure. Similarly, the average value of estimated coefficients for events is 0.000143, with a standard deviation almost seven times lager (0.000978). Overall, directionality of influence is largely evenly distributed across events. 23 exhibit positive mean estimated coefficients; those from the remaining twenty are negative. These figures reveal wide heterogeneities in the robustness, direction and magnitude of influence with which events are associated with *political talk*.

Against this backdrop, how many events—if any—were capable of performing robustly as regressors of political discussion*?*

I found sixteen events to be robustly significant predictors of political talk.[28] Figure 4 shows for each the average magnitude coefficient, the range of coefficient values within a 95% significance interval, and its significance rate. (Full event results are shown in appendix D1).

Three robust events are from Belgium: the break up of the Egmont federalization pact of 1978 and the political crisis it triggered; the political contingencies that occurred between 1980 and 1981, which included government crises provoked by state reform proposals towards federalization, a steep economic downturn, and the organization of a massive march against nuclear missiles; and the results of the December 1991 snap election,

[27] My discussion of event findings exclude results for the First and Second World Wars variables.

[28] In the 4 models of the regression set without cohort controls, 32 events exhibit average p-values below standard significance levels. This set of events shrinks to 8 once across the full space of regressions I analyzed. This notable drop suggest the existence of an omitted variable bias for event-based research without control variables at the cohort level.

FIGURE 4
META-ANALYTIC RESULTS FOR ROBUST EVENTS[1]

	Estimated Coefficients' Parameters		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables	Avg.[1]	+1.96 std. dev.	Sig. Rate[2]
		-.004 0 *.004*	
Belgium			
1.— '78. Egmont Pact Breakup.	-.0010*		.972***
2.— '80-'81. *Redressement* events.	.0012***		1.000***
3.— '92. Second Black Sunday.	.0007***		1.000***
France			
4.— '81. Socialist Electoral Victories.	.0008*		.875*
5.— '83. *Tournant de la Rigueur*.	-.0017***		1.000***
West Germany			
6.— '18-'20. German Revolution Events.	.0017***		.903**
7.— '77. RAF Terrorism: Red Autumn	-.0006***		1.000***
8.— '81. Peace Protests, Corruption Scandals. . .	.0020***		1.000***
9.— '83. Die Wende Events	-.0008***		1.000***
10.—'90. Reunification.	.0007***		1.000***
Italy			
11.—'76-'78. Events from *Anni di Piombo* period[3] .	.0005		.953***
12.—'80. Bologna Station Attack	-.0014*		1.000***
13.—'92-'94. *Anni di Fango* Events	.0024***		1.000***
Netherlands			
14.—'76-'77. Lockheed Affair, Gilmmen crisis . .	.0012***		1.000***
15.—'81. Euromissile Dissensus.	.0009***		1.000***
16.—'83. *Keerpunt* and Second Peace March	-.0012***		1.000***

Significance: +0.1 level; * 0.05 level; ** 0.01 level; 0.001 level.
[1] Significance levels show if the distribution of values were unidirectional at stadard levels of confidence.
[2] Significance levels from Robut Significance Indicator: probability that of a variable being significant in at least 75% of models given observed sigificance rate.
[3] Lockheed Scandal, Movimento del '77 social protest wave, Terrorist Attacks; Aldo Moro kidnap and murder.

which saw a steep increase in the vote share of the extreme right, and ended the nearly uninterrupted 11-year old tenure of demochristian Wilfried Martens as prime minister.

France has two robustly significant events: the victory of François Mitterrand in the French presidential elections of 1981 and the unprecedented absolute parliamentary majority that the left obtained in the legislative elections of that year; and the 180-degree turn in the economic policy of the Mitterrand government of 1983, which implemented sweeping neoliberal austerity reforms.

In West Germany, events that are robust predictors of *political talk* include the German Revolution and the consolidation of the Weimar Republic (1918-1920); the terrorist attack campaign conducted by the RAF in autumn '77, which led to the killing of the chairman of the German Business Association (BDA), the hijacking of an airplane, and the collective suicide of the leadership of the terrorist organization; the first wave of massive anti-nuclear protests and the corruption scandals (Flick and soon after Neue Heimat) that shook left and right wing political organizations in 1981; the collection of scandals, political crises, economic reform policies and antinuclear protests that occurred in 1983, a time that was then often referred to as *Die Wende*—the "turnaround"—; and finally, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the German Reunification process of 1989-1990.

Robust Italian events include those from the *anni di piombo* (or "lead years") period, which included the 1977 parliamentary inquiry commission into Lockheed kickbacks to Italian politicians, the wave of social contestation that occurred that wave, and the period of terrorism that peaked in the kidnap and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978; the terrorist attack against the Bologna train station in 1980; and the political murders, terrorist attacks, corruption scandals and political crises associated with the dissolution of the Italian postwar political system between 1992 and 1994.

The remaining robust events are from the Netherlands: the Dutch branch of the Lockheed corruption scandal of 1976 and the terrorist acts staged by Moluccan separatists in the Low Countries between that year and the next; the political polarization caused by NATO's decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Europe—commonly known as "Euromissiles" —and the staging of the first massive antinuclear protest in 1981; and the second antinuclear protest of 1983 and the implementation of neoliberal austerity policies by newly appointed prime minister Ruud Lubbers in 1983.

From these events, all but one (the events of the "lead years" in Italy between 1976 and 1978) are unidirectional predictors at standard levels of confidence. The range of their effects on *political talk* goes from 0.07—similar to the impact of yearly growth per capita—to 0.24—a figure comparable to the effects of income.

Nine political contingencies are associated with positive cohort increases in *political talk*. In ascending order of strength of influence, they include the Black Sunday in Belgium ('92); German Reunification ('90); the socialist electoral victories in France ('81); the 1981 Euromissile dissensus in the Netherlands; the *redressement* events of Belgium ('80-'81); the Dutch Lockheed and Moluccan terrorism crises of 1976-1977; the German Revolution events of 1918-1920; the German peace protest and corruption scandals of 1981; and the dissolution of the Italian Second Republic in 1992-1994.

Six events, on the other hand, are negative predictors of *political talk*.

They are, from minimum to maximum effects, the RAF terrorist acts ('77) and the *Wende* events of Germany ('83); the breakup of the Egmont Pact in Belgium ('78); the Peace March and the introduction of neoliberal policies in the Netherlands in 1983; the Bologna train station attack (Italy '80); and Mitterrand's neoliberal turn in 1983. Excepting the events

from the Belgian *Redressement* period, all the events associated with neoliberal turnarounds in the beginning of the eighties form part of this set.

These results show that several political contingencies can robustly affect *political talk*, but they still give an incomplete picture of general trends in robustness and direction of influence across all the event set I analyze. I examine these results with the help of Table 4, which shows cross-regression statistics for groups sharing characteristics related to their intensity and prospective influence. Columns 1 and 2 show the average significance rate for each of these groups, as well as the correlation between group adscription as well as its significance at standard levels. Columns 3 and 4 show equivalent figures for average estimated coefficients.

How related are measures of an event's intensity to its robustness and direction of influence?

Table 4 shows that significance rates are only weakly related with the duration of an event. The correlation between these variables (0.204), is non significant and small in magnitude. With respect to average coefficients, the duration of an event follows a stronger, positive and significant correlation, suggesting that longer events tend to be positively associated with *political talk*.

My results show little relationship between significance rates and experiential intensity. Mild events hold higher average SRs and average estimated coefficients than events of moderate and high experiential intensity.

With respect to narrative diversity, significance rate follows, if anything, a negative relationship: the most narratively simple events tend to be significant predictors of *political talk* more systematically. Regarding average estimated coefficients, events with two narrative sequences and the most narratively complex events—those with 6 sequences or more—

TABLE 4
VARIABLES OF EVENEMENTIAL EXPOSURE: META-ANALYTICAL PARAMETERS BY GROUP[1]

		Rate of Significance		Average Est. Coefficient.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Attributes	*n*	Mean	Corr.[2]	Mean	Corr.[2]
Characteristics related to an event's synchronic strength					
A.—Duration (months)	43	.605	.204	.00014	.381*
B.—*Experiential intensity*					
Moderate Intensity	21	.650	.137	.00008	-.064
Higher: terrorist acts, economic crises	15	.572	-.073	.00008	-.046
Highest: generalized political violence	7	.538	.571	.00047	.147
C.—*Narrative Diversity*[3]					
One political discussion sequence	10	.720	.198	.00021	.038
Two sequences	13	.503	-.207	-.00032	-.315*
Between 3 and 5 sequences	17	.624	.049	.00026	.101
Six or more sequences	3	.546	-.049	.00124	.311*
D.—*Political disruptiveness*					
No government fall	13	.579	-.052	.00020	.039
One government fall	16	.606	.005	.00004	-.081
Two ore more gov't falls	14	.625	.046	.00020	.045
Characteristics related to recency and political influence					
E— Recency (years; base: 2002)	43	.605	.510***	.00014	-.001
F.—*Effectiveness*					
Produced lasting political turnarounds	8	.831	.336*	.00014	.095
Did not	35	.553	-.336*	.00015	-.095
By main type of disruption					
G.—Insurrections	2	.514	-.027	.00089	.148
Terrorist acts	2	1.000	.274+	-.00098	-.240+
Protests and strikes	8	.461	-.128	.00053	-.056
Corruption and malpractice scandals	2	.299	-.161	-.00033	-.105
Political crises	11	.548	-.017	-.00035	-.286*
Elections	4	.642	.075	.00063	.135
Multiple	14	.720	.307*	.00056	.243+
Wars[4]	7	.276	-.347*	.00040	.092

[1] Excludes war variables.
[2] p-value testing hypotheses of no correlation. * Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; ****Significant at the 0.001 level.
[3] Number of narratively independent sequences of disruptive political occurrences.
[4] World Wars I and II.

exhibit significant negative and positive correlations. Overall, however, no clear association is visible between narrative diversity and estimated coefficients' figures. Political disruptiveness is not meaningfully associated with average significance rates or estimated coefficients either. Significance rates grows from events that led to no government falls to those that provoked two or more, but the magnitude of this increase is very small. My results also suggest that average estimated coefficients follow a quadratic relationship across the number of government falls provoked by an event. However, none of the event groups related to government falls was significantly correlated with this parameter.

Are cross-regression parameters more strongly organized, on the other hand, by recency and consequentiality?

My results suggest that this is indeed the case. The correlation between significance rates and the year of occurrence of an event is positive, significant, and the strongest of all the groups and event characteristics I examine.

Results also show that events that suddenly changed the direction of state action (for example, the German Revolution or the *Wende*, *Keerpunt,* or *Tournant de la Rigueur* neoliberal turnarounds in Germany and Belgium) are much more frequent predictors of political talk. On average, they are significant in 83.1% of the regressions. Membership in this group, on the other hand show no strong relationship with estimated coefficients.

Finally, I evaluated how different types of events held different kinds of associations with *political talk*. Several exhibit relationships with significance rates or average coefficients worth noting.

Variables encompassing multiple types of events are also correlated significantly and positively with both significance rates and estimated coefficients. On the other hand, the two

events related mainly to acts of terrorism—which tend to produce rallying effects (Hetherington and Nelson 2003; Dinesen and Jaeger 2013)—manage to be significant in all the regressions I conducted and hold a significant correlation with significance rate. They also are significantly and negatively correlated with average coefficient values. These results are suggestive, but except for events related to multiple types of disruptions, the very small number of events included by these sets of events greatly limits their inferential power.

Events mainly related to political crises, on the other hand, show no strong relationship with significance rates, but they are negatively and significantly correlated with estimated coefficients.

Results by type of events also exhibit interesting negative findings. Corruption scandals, for instance, exhibit much smaller significance rates than the global event mean. (Similarly, variables of exposure to world wars exhibit such smaller SR figures that they are significantly correlated negatively with this parameter, thus indicating that these variables are poor predictors of *predictor talk* in the long run.)

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Recent influential voices within historical sociology have singled out studying how and when events come to have durable and transformative consequences has been singled out as an important line of inquiry for social historical inquiry (Sewell 1996; Clemens 2007, 528, 541; Wagner Pacifici 2017). In addition, recent political developments have also added have added substantive to relevance to this inquiry. After the relative historical restraint of the nineties, unforeseen and powerful political contingencies have taken center stage in contemporary times across the globe and call for a renewed scholarly engagement in the

production of fine-grain knowledge on the legacies that historical events have on individual-level political behavior.

My investigation sought to contribute to move the research in this direction. Beyond verifying whether event effects on political attributes exist, it focused on studying how, how much, and how frequently moments of political contingency can exert lasting cohort impact in a foundational political attribute such as political engagement. Departing from the approaches of generational research to event effects, I proposed to understand these heterogeneities using an original set of hypotheses based on a diachronic outlook to long-lasting event effects. This outlooks sees event influences on political behavior as less related to what a historical contingency makes when it occurs than in the micro- and macro-political legacies it leaves when it is no longer active. I tested these hypotheses, as well as others related to generational research and lines of research skeptic of event effects, by exploring how exposure to 34 periods of heightened political contingency from Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands were associated with persistent cohort differences in frequency of political talk, an everyday behavioral measure of political engagement, from 1973 to 2002.

My analysis produced findings that allow evaluating the hypotheses I identified on how events persistently affect politicization levels. Table 5 provides a summary of the empirical traction of these hypotheses against the backdrop of my results, and a brief description of the key evidence produced by my investigation to sustain them or disconfirm them.

TABLE 5
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES

Hypotheses	(1) Empirical Support	(2) Key Evidence
H1.— No historical effects.	No	Event variables and cohort levels of educational attainment are robust predictors of *political talk*.
H2.— No event effects independent of historical socialization contexts. . .	No	16 events variables are robust significant predictors of *political talk* in regressions that include cohort-level controls.
Generational Hypotheses		
H3a.—Positive Effects.	No	20 event variables exhibit negative mean est. coefficients. 9 of them are unidirectional at standard levels of confidence, and 6 are are also robustly significant negative predictors of *political talk*.
H3b.— Temporal Stability of Effects. . .	No	No robustly significant event variable but one occurred before 1975.
H3c.— Intensity increases robustness of influence.	No	No association between indicators of political disruptiveness, experiential strength, or narrative diversity of an event and its robutness or magnitude of influence on *political talk*.
Diachronic Hypotheses		
H4a.— Fading Effects.	Strong	Strong, positive, and significant correlation between an event's recency and its significance rate.
H4b.— Polarization affects directionality.	Indicative	Events mainly associated with acts of terrorism are negatively and significantly correlated with negative effects on *political talk*.
H3c.— Effectiveness affects robustness of influence. . .	Strong	Positive and significant correlation between an event's capacity to modify state action and its significance rate.

My findings disconfirm Hypothesis 1, which considers levels of political engagement insensitive to historical socialization processes. Event variables and cohort levels of educational attainments were both significant predictors of *political talk* (the impact of the latter, however, ran in the opposite direction to the one espoused by the literature). Similarly, they did not find support for Hypothesis 2, which expected that once controlling for the

broader historical socialization factors, historical events would not be significantly associated with political discussion. Sixteen events were robust predictors of *political talk* in the presence of cohort level controls. Substantively, the magnitude of influence of these contingencies was not marginal. The range of their predicted impact was similar to the one related to gdp growth per capita, and in some cases it was comparable to income's.

Besides showing that major political contingencies can persistently impact levels of politicization, my findings also allow evaluating hypotheses on how these impact takes place.

Generational hypotheses perform poorly as explanatory arguments of evenemential influence on political discussion. Hypothesis 3a, which predicted that the association between events and political talk would be consistently positive. Of the event variables I analyzed, only a slim majority (23, or 53.4% of the event set) exhibited on average positive associations with *political talk*. Among the events that perform as robust predictors of *political talk*, six have a negative impact.

Contrary to Hypothesis 3b, I did not find evidence to support the view that event effects go unaffected by time. On the contrary, they suggest that the newness of an event is an important factor in making it have an impact on politicization. The recency of an event is positively and significantly correlated with significance rates. In addition, excepting the German Revolution events, events that occurred before the seventies fail to be systematically associated with levels of politicization.

Finally, I found that events that scored high in political disruptiveness, experiential intensity, and narrative diversity were no more robust as explanators of *political talk* than events with lower scores. These findings provide little evidence to support Hypothesis 3c, which contends that we should expect an event being a more robust predictor of political engagement the more intense it manifested in people's experiences when it occurred.

My analysis results align better with the diachronic hypotheses on event effects I introduced in this investigation. Consistent with Hypothesis 4a, which posits that event effects on politicization erode over time, my results strongly indicate that an event's capacity to be a robust predictor of *political talk* descends as it fades from present experience. In fact, the relationship between the year when an event occurred and its significance is the strongest among the event characteristics I analyzed.

My results also trend in a direction supportive of Hypothesis 4b, which posits that an event's direction of impact on politicization is positive or negative depending on whether it is polarizing or cohesive. The two events mainly related to terrorist attacks, which typically produce rallying effects, are robustly significant and unidirectional predictors of political talk. On the other hand, events related to insurrections—which are typically related to high levels of political polarization—, are the type of events that exhibits the largest positive correlation with *political talk*. The duration of an event, which can be thought of as more conducive for development of political polarization, is also strongly, positively, and significantly associated with political talk.

The small quantity of events upon which these results are premised, however, prevents them to be taken as fully conclusive. Nevertheless, they indicate a pattern that should be explored more thoroughly by future research.

With respect to directionality of influence, my analysis also found that nearly all the periods of political contingency associated with the implantation of neoliberal economic reforms in the early eighties were robust negative predictors of cohort levels of political discussion. These results suggest that this economic liberalization period played a depoliticizing role as a political socialization environment. The study of this potential role constitutes a relevant avenue for future research.

Finally, my findings produce evidence that is strongly supportive of Hypothesis 3, which contends that events that generated sweeping changes in state structures of policies tend to be more robust predictors of political talk. This type of events are positively, strongly, and significantly associated with significance rates.

All in all, the results of my analysis strongly indicate that besides being able to impact collective memory processes and issue positions, historical events can also perform as influential socialization factors for foundational political attributes like politicization.

My analysis also produced suggestive evidence on how these influences are organized, indicating that events are not different so much in the *degree* to which they relate to political engagement but in their *logic* of association with it. This association seems to be dynamic and recursively negotiated in connection with people's political changes across the life cycle and with ongoing political developments. The findings that support this contention are based in a research design that modeled event effects not as discontinuous but as graded across cohorts, that introduced controls for cohort-level factors not related to evenemential exposure, and that centered in the analysis of 360 regressions.

While this research environment provides a more robust research environment to study event effects than the standard approaches that are used to do so, it still carries several inferential limitations related to the small number of events ascribed to several analytically relevant categories of contingencies, and whether these results can be generalized to contingencies from other places and periods. These are relevant caveats that need to be addressed by subsequent research. My study seeks to motivate these future investigations by providing an expanded and enhanced set of theoretical outlooks, research designs, measurement instruments, and empirical results to conduct comparative research on event effects and keep refining our knowledge of the role that historical contingency plays as a

political socialization factor. Against the backdrop of the multiple contingencies that have defined the political experiences of recent times, there will be many historical moments and substantive motivation to take on these task in coming years.

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Schuman, Howard, and Amy Corning. 2012. "Generational Memory and the Critical Period: Evidence for National and World Events." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 76(1): 1-31.

Sears, David, and Nicholas Valentino. 1997. "Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Preadult Socialization." *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 45-65.

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Stora, Benjamin. 2020 *La gangrène et l'oubli. La mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie.* Paris: La Découverte.

Tota, Anna Lisa. 2003. *La città ferita. Memoria e comunicaziones pubblica della strage di Bologna, 2 agosto 1980.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

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Young, Cristobal. 2009. "Model Uncertainty in Sociological Research: An Application to Religion and Economic Growth." *American Sociological Review* 74(3): 380-397.

Zeitlin, Maurice. 1966. "Political Generations in the Cuban Working Class." *American Journal of Sociology* 71(5): 493-508.

Apppendix A
Distribution of Political Discussion Responses by Cohort

1.— Belgium



2.— France



3.— West Germany



4.— Italy



5.— Netherlands



[1] Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend Dataset

APPENDIX B
Selection of Historical Events
Coding of attributes and selected bibliography

Western European and Country-Specific National Monographies consulted.

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Blom, J.C.H., and E. Lamberts, eds. *History of the Low Countries*. New York: Berghahn.
Clark, Martin. 2008. *Modern Italy. 1871 to the Present*. Harlow: Longman
Conklin, Alice, Sarah Fishman, and Robert Zaretsky. 2010. *France and its empire since 1870*. Oxford: Oxford University.
Dunnage, Jonathan. 2002. *Twentieth Century Italy*. A Social History. London: Pearson
Ginsborg, Paul. 2000. *Storia d'Italia dal Dopoguerra a Oggi*. Turin: Einaudi.
Judt, Tony. 2005. *A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin.
Kitchen, Martin. 2002. *A History of Modern Germany*. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell
Maier, Charles. 1975. *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after the First World War*. Princeton: Princeton University.
McMillan, James, and William Doyle, eds. 2003. *Modern France, 1980-2002*. Oxford: Oxford University.
Sassoon, Donald. 1996. *One Hundred Years of Socialism*. New York: The New Press.
Tipton, Frank. 2003. *A History of Modern Germany since 1815*. Los Angeles: UCLA
Winkler, Heinrich. 2007. *Germany. The Long Road West*. Oxford: Oxford University.
Witte, Els, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen. 2009. *Political History of Belgium from 1830 Onwards*. Brussels: ASP.

Belgium

Belgian events include the results of the 1936 General Election and the Summer Strikes that followed suit; the abdication of king Leopold III (1950); the large catholic protests against the Collard Education Bill in 1955; the Belgian intervention in Congo shortly after its independence in 1960 and the Winter Strikes against economic austerity measures in the winter that year; the split of the University of Leuven along linguistic lines (1968); the sudden breakup of the Egmont Pact, which reorganized the Belgian state along communitarian lines, in 1978; the government crises generated by state reforms and

economic crises in 1980; the First and Second Peace Marches of 1981 and 1983; the electoral success of the extreme right and the unexpected defeat of Wilfried Martens in the 1992 Snap Election; the Augusta-Dassault corruption scandal of 1995, and the Marc Dutroux Judicial Scandal and the White March organized in reaction to it on 1996.

1936. First Black Sunday, Summer General Strikes
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	12 months.
Beginning	May 1936: General Election Results.
End:	April 1937: Degrelle – Van Zeeland parliamentary election run-off.
Narrative Sequences:	Electoral breakthrough of extreme right-wing Rexist Party and Establishment of Grand Coalition; Summer Labor Strikes.
Government Falls:	Van Zeeland I.

Selected Bibliography:

Bondas Joseph, and Jef Rens. 1936. *Un nouveau départ. La grève de juin 1936*. Brussels: Commission syndicale de Belgique.

Dumoulin, Michel, Emmanuel Gerard, Mark Van den Wijngaert, and Vincent Dujardin. 2005. *Nouvelle histoire de Belgique: Volume 2, 1905-1950*. Brussels: Complexe.

Gérard-Libois, Jules. 1989. "REX 1936-1940. Flux, reflux, tensions et dislocations." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 1226: 1-40.

1950. Léopold III Crisis and Murder of Julien Lahaut.
(Political crisis)

Duration:	6 months.
Peak Beginning:	March 1950: Results of Referendum on the return of king Léopold III to Belgium.
Peak End:	August 1950: Abdication of Léopold III and murder of communist party chairman Julien Lahaut.
Narrative Sequences:	Léopold III abdication; murder of Julien Lahaut.
Government Falls:	Eyskens (Gaston) I; Duvieusart.

Selected Bibliography:

Centre de recherche d'information sociopolitique (CRISP). 1974. "Dossier 'Question Royale'." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 646: 1-32.

Dolhet, Manu. 2001. "Juillet 50: de la question royale à la question belge." *La Revue Toudi* 42-43. Accessed on June 2, 2019 at https://www.larevuetoudi.org/fr/story/juillet-50-de-la-question-royale-à-la-question-belge.
Gérard-Libois, Jules, and José Gotovitch. 1983. "Léopold III: le non-retour." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 1010: 1-28.

1955. Collard Law Protests
(Protests)

Duration:	6 months.
Peak Beginning:	February 1955: Introduction of the "Collard Laws", a series of secularizing education reform proposals introduced by socialist education minister Léo Collard.
Peak End:	July 1955: demonstration of catholic organizations against the Collard Laws in Brussels and passage of the Laws in Parliament.
Narrative Sequences:	Collard Law Protests.
Government Falls	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Haagdorens, Lize. 1984. "De Mobilisatie Van de Katholieke Zuil in de Schoolstrijd tijdens het eerste jaar van de regering Van Acker." *BTNG-RBHC* 15(1-2): 3-70.
Tyssens, Jeffrey. 1997. *Guerre et paix scolaires, 1950-1958*. Brussels: De Boeck.

1960. Intervention in Congo, Unitary Law Strikes
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	5 months[1]
Peak Beginning:	July 1960: Beginning of Belgian intervention in independent Congo
Peak End:	January 1961: Strikes against the "Unitary" Austerity Law introduced by Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens.
Narrative Sequences:	Belgian intervention in Congo; Unitary Law Strikes.
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

[1] The duration of this contingency period adds the span of two non-contiguous events: the Belgian intervention in Congo after its independence (July 1960-September 1960); and the organization of a large wave of strikes in opposition to economic austerity measures announced by Prime Minister Eyskens (December 1960-January 1961).

Brassine de la Buissière, Jacques, and Georges-Henri Dumont. 2010. "Les autorités belges et la décolonisation du Congo." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 2063-2064: 9-117.
CRISP. 1960. "La répercussion des événements congolais sur la situation et les décisions politiques en Belgique". *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 72: 1-20.
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Gerard, Emmanuel, and Bruce Kuklick. 2015. *Death in the Congo. Murdering Patrice Lumumba.* Cambridge: Harvard University.

1968. Split of the Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) crises.
(Political Crisis)

Duration:	5 months.
Peak Beginning:	January 1968: Unilateral announcement of KUL's French section of a program of expansion to Dutch-speaking outskirts of Brussels
Peak End:	June 1968: The recently established government of Gaston Eyskens announces the transfer of the French section of KUL away from Leuven.
Narrative Sequences:	Split of the Catholic University of Leuven; Split of Belgian Christian Parties along linguistic lines.
Government Falls:	Vanden Boeynants I.

Selected Bibliography:

CRISP. 1967. "Évolution et implications de l'affaire de Louvain (II)." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP,* 364-365: 1-36.
CRISP. 1968. "Les derniers développements de l'affaire de Louvain." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 394: 1-22.
CRISP. 1968. "Les derniers développements de l'affaire de Louvain II." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 398: 1-24.
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Horn, Gerd Rainer. 2005. "The Belgian Contribution to Global 1968." *BTNG-RBHC* 35(4): 597-635.
Laporte, Christian. 1999. *L'affaire de Louvain 1960-1968*, Louvain-la-Neuve: De Boeck Université.

1978. Egmont Pact Breakdown
(Political Crisis)

Duration:	7 months.
Peak Beginning:	September 1978: Resignation of Prime Minister Leo Tindemans after the unexpected defeat of a state reform reorganizing the Belgian state along community lines.
Peak End:	April 1979: Installation of Wilfried Martens as prim minister.
Narrative Sequences:	Federalization Political Crises; Split of Socialist Parties along linguistic lines.
Government Falls:	Tindemans III.

Selected Bibliography:

Brassinne, Jacques, and Xavier Mabille. 1978. "La crise politique d'octobre 1978 I." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 817: 1-27.

Brassinne, Jacques, and Xavier Mabille. 1978. "La crise politique d'octobre 1978 II." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 819*:* 1-276.

Covell, Maureen. 1984. "Agreeing to Disagree: Elite Bargaining and the Revision of the Belgian Constitution." *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* 15(3): 451-469.

Verleden, Frederik. 2009. "Splitting the Difference: the Radical Approach of the Belgian Parties." Pp. 145-166 in *Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe,* edited by Wilfried Swenden and Bart Maddens. London: Palgrave.

1980-1981. Events from the *Redressement* period
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	23 months.[2]
Peak Beginning:	December 1979: Flemish Christian's party rejection of the formation of a government entity for Brussels of equal juridical status to Flanders and Wallonia.
Peak End:	February 1982: Parliamentary granting of decree government powers to newly reappointed Prime Minister Wilfried Martens.
Narrative Sequences:	Second federalization Crises, Economic Adjustment Crises, First Peace March.
Government Falls:	Martens II, Martens III, Martens IV, Eyskens (Mark).

Selected Bibliography:

Adam, Bernard, and Pierre Arcq. 1980. "L'installation des armes nucléaires a longue portée (LRTNF) en Belgique". *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 883-884: 2-48.

[2] The duration of this contingency period adds the span of two non-contiguous instances of contingency: the government crisis connected with disagreements over the federalization of Belgium (December 1979-October 1980); and the period where the First Peace March occurred and government crises related to economic policy disputes developed (March 1981- February 1982).

Arcq, Étienne, and Maurice Piraux. 1981. "L'accord interprofessionnel du 13 février 1981." *Courier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 914: 1-26.
Boydens, Isabelle. 1994. "Un mouvement pour la paix au coeur des tensions nationales et internationales: Pax Christi." *BTNG-RBHC* 25(3-4): 481-537.
Brassinne, Jacques. 1980. "La reforme de l'État (II)." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 874-875: 1-77.
Brassinne, Jacques. 1980. "La reforme de l'État (III): du gouvernement Martens II au vote des lois de réformes institutionnelles sous le gouvernement Martens III." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 893-894: 1-42.
CRISP.1980. "La révision de la Constitution (juin-juillet 1980)." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 892: 1-30.
CRISP.1981. "Les facteurs d'instabilité gouvernementale: décembre 1978-avril 1981." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 916: 1-28.
Mabille, Xavier. 1981. "Les élections législatives du 8 novembre 1981 (I)." *Courier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 943: 1-22.
Mabille, Xavier. 1981. "Les élections législatives du 8 novembre 1981 (II)." *Courier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 944: 1-21.
Martens, Wilfried, 2006. *Mémoires pour mon pays*. Tielt: Racine Lannoo.

1983. Second Peace March
(Protests)

Duration:	3 months.
Peak Beginning:	October 1983: 300,000 demonstrators attend a protest against the installment of NATO nuclear missiles in Belgium.
Peak End:	December 1983: After numerous delays, Prime Minister Martens finally agrees to the deployment of 48 NATO nuclear missiles in Belgium by 1985.
Narrative Sequences:	Peace Protests.
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Dujardin, Vincent. 2009. "From Helsinki to the missiles question: A minor role for small countries? The case of Belgium 1973-1985." Pp. 72-85 in *The Crisis of Détente in Europe*, edited by Leopoldo Nuti. London: Routledge.
Gérard, Andrée. 1984. "La dynamique du mouvement de paix en Belgique francophone." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 1053-1054: 2-68.
Stouthuysen, Patrick. 2004. "Oud en nieuw in één. De vredesbeweging als atypische nieuwe sociale beweging." *BTNG-RBHC* 3: 399-419.
Van der Beek, Matthijs. 2016. "Beyond Hollanditis: The Campaigns against the Cruise Missiles in the Benelux. 1979-1985." *Dutch Crossing* 40(1): 39-53.

1992. Second "Black Sunday" and resignation of Wilfried Martens.

(Elections)

Duration:	5 months.
Peak Beginning:	November 1991: Prime Minister Wilfried Martens unexpectedly loses the anticipated elections he had convoked in a bid to break parliamentary gridlock. The elections also see soaring support for the Vlaams Blok, a recently constituted extreme right-wing Flemish party.
Peak End:	March 1992: A grand coalition appoints Jean-Luc Dehaene as Prime Minister, ending a decade of Wilfried Martens governments and lack of participation of socialist parties in the government.
Narrative Sequences:	November 1991 General Election Results
Government Falls:	Martens IX.

Selected Bibliography:

Mabille, Xavier, Evelyne Lentzen, and Pierre Blaise. 1991. "Les élections législatives du 24 novembre 1991." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 1335-1336*:* 1-54.

Mabille, Xavier, and Jacques Brassinne. 1992. "La formation du gouvernement et des exécutifs." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 1356: 1-40.

Swyngedouw, Mark. 1992. "L'essor d'Agalev et du Vlaams Blok." *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP* 1362: 1-42.

1995-1996. Agusta-Dassault Scandal, Dutroux Affair.
(Scandal)

Duration:	14 months.[3]
Peak Beginning:	February 1995: the treasurer of the Socialist Flemish Party accuses high-profile socialist politicians of having participating in a kickback scheme related to contracts assigned to the Italian company Agusta by the Belgian Air Force.
Peak End:	April 1997: Marc Dutroux, a child murderer and molester that had repeatedly failed to be brought to justice, escapes from jail after being finally detained. His escape triggers the resignation of Justice minister Stefaan de Clark, who had kept his cabinet position even after the organization of a 500,000 protest against Belgian judicial malpractices of the Dutroux case.
Narrative Sequences:	Agusta-Dassault Affair; Dutroux Affair and White March.
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

[3] The duration of this contingent period adds two non-contiguous contingency periods: the Agusta-Dassault Corruption Affair (February 1995-June 1995); and the Dutroux Scandal and the White March staged as a reaction to it (August 1996-April 1997).

Barrez, Dirk. 1998. *Le pays des 1000 scandales, un quart de siècle d'affaires en Belgique.* Gerpinnes: Quorum.
Fijnaut, Cyrille. 2001. "Crisis and Reform in Belgium: The Dutroux Affair and the Criminal Justice System". Pp. 235-250 in *Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities,* edited by Uriel Rosenthal, Arjen Boin, and Louise K. Comfort. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.
Maesschalck, Jeroen. 2006. "How scandals affect the values and policies of decision makers," Pp. 213-227 in *Scandals in Past and Contemporary Politics,* edited by John Garrard and James Newell. Manchester: Manchester University.
Walgrave, Stefaan, and Frédéric Varone. 2008. "Bringing Parties Back in: Policy Change after the Dutroux Crisis in Belgium." *Governance.* 21(3): 365-395.
Walgrave, Stefaan, and Benoît Rihoux. 1997. *De Witte Mars. Eén jaar later.* Leuven: Van Halewyck.

Newspaper Sources.
Le Soir. News on Agusta and Dassault corruption Cases*,* September 1988 to December 1995.
Nash, Nathaniel, "NATO Secretary General Questioned in Belgian Scandal." *The New York Times,* March 1, 1995.
Lambert, Sarah, "Kickback scandal threatens Belgium." *The Independent,* January 19, 1994.
Whitney, Craig, "International Business. Belgium Convicts 12 for Corruption on Military Contracts." *The New York Times,* December 24, 1998.

France

French events include the Anti Parliamentary Riots of 1934, the Left-wing Unitary Rally of 1935, and the Electoral Victory of the Popular Front and the Strike Waves it triggered in 1936; the end of the tripartite National Unity government in 1947 and the strike wave it triggered in the fall; France's defeat against the Viet Minh in Dien Bien Phu and the political crises it unleashed in 1954; the first Algiers Putsch and the Start of the Fifth Republic in 1958; France's final retreat and the military, political, and terrorist crises it triggered in 1961 and 1962; the Spring '68 protests, strikes, and political crises; the unexpectedly strong electoral victories of the Socialist Party and François Mitterrand in 1981; and his rapid and sudden adoption of neoliberal policies in 1983, which are commonly known as the *Tournant de la Rigueur.*

1934-1936. Events from the Popular Front Formation period:
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	12 months.[4] (January-February 1934; June-September 1935; January-June 1936)
Peak Beginning:	January 1934: Extreme right-wing riots lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Camille Chautemps.
Peak End:	June 1936: A massive strike wave organized after the electoral victory of the Popular Front leads to the signature of the Matignon labor agreements.
Narrative Sequences:	Anti-Parliamentary Riots (1934); Unitary Rally (1935), Popular Front Victory (1936), Summer Strikes (1936).
Government Falls:	Chautemps II; Daladier I; Doumergue II, Flandin I; Bouissson I; Laval II.

Selected Bibliography:

Berstein, Serge. 1976. *Le 6 février 1934*. Paris: Gallimard.

Dubief, Henri. 1989. *Nouvelle Histoire de la France contemporaine. Le déclin de la Troisième République 1929-1938*. Paris: Seuil.

Monier, Frédéric. 1998. *Le complot dans la république,* Paris: La Découverte, 247-269.

Jackson, Julian. 1985. *The Politics of Depression in France, 1932-1936*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Jackson, Julian. 1990. *The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy, 1934-1938*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Jenkins, Brian, and Chris Millington, eds. 2015. *France and Fascism. February 1934 and the Dynamics of Political Crisis*. London: Routledge.

Jenkins, Brian. 2006. "The *Six Février* 1934 and the 'Survival' of the French Republic." *French History* 20(3): 333-351.

Prost, Antoine. 1966. "Les manifestations du 12 février 1934 en province." *Le mouvement social* 54: 6-27

Prost, Antoine. 2002. "Les grèves de mai-juin 1936 revisitées." *Le Mouvement Social* 200.2): 3-54.

Roche, Émile. 1978. "Caillaux: Les pleins pouvoirs." *Revue des deux mondes,* January, 78-81.

Tartakowsky, Danielle. 1986. *Les manifestations de rue en France 1918-1968*. Paris: Université de la Sorbonne.

Tilly, Charles, and Edward Shorter. 1974. *Strikes in France 1830-1968*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

[4] The duration of this contingency period adds three non-contiguous moments of contingency: the Chiappe Anti Parliamentary Riots (January-February 1934), the staging of the Unitary left-wing rally (June-September 1935), and the electoral victory of the Popular Front, as well as the wave of strikes that developed soon after it (January-Jun 1936).

1947. Fall of Unitary Government, Autumn Strikes
(Political Crisis)

Duration:	9 months.
Peak Beginning:	May 1947: Expulsion of the French Communist Party from the governing coalition led by socialist Paul Ramadier.
Peak End:	November 1947: Ramadier resigns as prime minister following a large-scale strike wave that month.
Narrative Sequences:	Dissolution of Unitary Government; Establishment and Electoral Victories of Gaullist Front; November strikes
Government Falls:	Ramadier II.

Selected Bibliography

Berstein, Serge, and Pierre Milza, eds. 1999. *L'année 1947*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Graham, B.D. 2006. *Choice and Democratic Order. The French Socialist Party, 1937-1950*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Mencherini, Robert. 1998. *Guerre froide, grèves rouges. Parti communiste, stalinisme et luttes sociales en Frances. Les grèves 'insurrectionnelles' de 1947-1948*. Paris: Syllepse

Rioux, Jean-Pierre. 1980. *Nouvelle Histoire de la France contemporaine, tome 15: La France de la Quatrième République. L'ardeur et la nécessité.* Paris: Seuil.

Tilly, Charles. 1984. "Strikes, Demonstrations, and Social Movements in Twentieth Century France." Working Paper 311, CRSO, Ann Arbor.

1954. Indochina Retreat Crises
(Political Crisis)

Duration:	10 months.
Peak Beginning:	November 1953: French forces in Vietnam launch a military offensive in the valley of Dien Bien Phu.
Peak End:	August 1954: a month after signing the Geneva Agreements granting independence to Vietnam, recently appointed Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France submits for parliamentary consideration France's participation in the European Defense Community. After years in a parliamentary limbo, the motion is finally rejected.
Narrative Sequences:	Dien Bien Phu defeat, European Defense Community Question; Genève Agreements Government Crisis.
Government Falls:	Laniel I.

Selected Bibliography:

Atwood Lawrence, Mark, and Fredrik Logevall. 2007. *The First Vietnam War. Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis.* Cambridge: Harvard University

Dalloz, Jacques. 1987. *La Guerre d'Indochine 1945-1954,* Paris: Seuil.

Dufresne, Catherine. 2006. "The First Indochina War and the Failure of the European Defense Community 1950-1954". Master's Thesis, Department of History, Concordia University.
Randle, Robert. 1969. *Geneva 1954. The Settlement of the Indochinese War.* Princeton: Princeton University.
Ruscio, Alain. 1986. *Dien Bien Phu: La fin d'une illusion.* Paris: L'Harmattan.
Ruscio, Alain. 2003. *La guerre française et l'Indochine (1945-1954). Les sources de la connaissance.* Paris: Les Indes Savantes.
Turpin, Frédéric. 2001. "Printemps 1954. Échec à de Gaulle: un retour au pouvoir manqué." *Revue Historique* 303(4): 913-927.

1958. First Algiers Putsch and Establishment of Fifth Republic
(Insurrection)

Duration:	5 months.
Peak Beginning:	April 1958: Prime Minister Félix Gaillard resigns after the failing to gain a confidence vote on the question of Algerian independence.
Peak End:	September 1958: The Fifth Republic is established after a new Constitution made under the supervision of Charles de Gaulle, who had stepped in as Prime Minister after a military coup on May, is overwhelmingly approved by a referendum.
Narrative Sequences:	First Algiers Putsch and Establishment of Fifth Republic; Spring Left-wing Demonstrations.
Government Falls:	Gaillard I; Pflimlin I.

Selected Bibliography:

Amiri, Linda. 2004. *La bataille de France: La guerre d'Algérie en métropole.* Paris: Robert Laffont.
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1961-1962. Events from the Algerian Retreat Period
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	22 months.
Peak Beginning:	November 1960: President Charles de Gaulle makes a turnaround in his policy towards Algerian independence and announces a referendum on Algerian self-determination.
Peak End:	July 1962: At least 95 European Algerians are killed in Oran one month after France's recognition of Algerian independence, accelerating the evacuation of French citizens from the former colony.
Narrative Sequences:	Algerian Independence Process; First Wave of OAS Terrorism; Second Algiers Putsch; Repression of Algerian and Left-Wing Protests, Second Wave of AS Terrorism; Murder Attempt against De Gaulle; Bab-el-Oued and Oran Massacres.
Government Falls:	Debré I.

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1968. Events of the Spring '68 period
(Protests)

Duration:	2 months.
Peak Beginning:	May 1968: Student sit-in in the Sorbonne University in downtown Paris are violently repressed.
Peak End:	June 1968: An anticipated General Election gives De Gaulle a strong electoral victory and an unprecedented absolute majority in the French National Assembly.
Narrative Sequences:	Student Protests; Strike Wave and Grenelle Agreements; Spring '68 Political Crises.
Government Falls:	Pompidou I.

Selected Bibliography:

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De Massot, François. 1969. "La grève générale mai-juin 1968." Paris: *L'Harmattan*.

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1981. Socialist Electoral Victories
(Elections)

Duration:	3 Months
Peak Beginning:	April 1981: Victory of François Mitterrand in the 1981 Presidential Elections.
Peak End:	June 1981. The anticipated legislative elections called for by Mitterrand produce an absolute majority of the left in the French parliament for the first time in history.
Narrative Sequences:	Socialist Electoral Victories.
Government Falls:	Barre I.

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1983. Tournant de la Rigueur
(Political Crisis)

Duration:	10 months
Peak Beginning:	March 1983: Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy announces neoliberal policies to contain the economic crises and the reversal of the economic policies decisions established by the Mitterrand presidency.
Peak End:	The "marche des beurs" against racism enters to Paris, where it is attended by 100,000 demonstrators.
Narrative Sequences:	*Tournant de la Rigueur* austerity policies; *Marche des beurs* and politicization of migration.
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

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West Germany

In West Germany, 18 years featured major political contingencies. These periods begin in the years between 1918 and 1920, which witnessed a sequence of events related to the downfall of the Prussian Empire and the Establishment of the Weimar Republic. They subsequently include the multiple events generated by the 1923 war reparation crisis; the unexpectedly strong showing of the Nazi Party in the General Elections of 1930; the cabinet crises of 1932 and 1933, which paved the way to the arrival of Adolf Hitler's to the Chancellorship; the political reintegration of the Western part of Germany into the Federal Republic between 1948 and 1949; the partition of Berlin in 1951 and the Spiegel Civil Rights Affair of 1962; the Extra Parliamentary Opposition (APO) protests of 1967; the wave of terrorist acts produced by the RAF in 1972 and the government crisis informed by the *Ostpolitik* policy of Willy Brandt the same year; the wave of terrorist acts produced by the RAF in the "German Autumn" of 1977; the popular mobilizations against nuclear weapon deployment and the Flick and Neue Heimat corruption scandals of 1981; the Nuclear Action Week and the arrival to power of demochristian Helmut Kohl, commonly know as *Die Wende;* the fall of the Berlin Wall and German Reunification process of 1990, and the CDU illegal financing scandal of 2000.

1918-1920. German Revolution Events
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	19 months.[5]
Peak Beginning:	January 1918: Major strikes against the continuation of World War I erupt in Berlin.
Peak End:	April 1920: The German army breaks into the Ruhr and crushes an uprising of workers in the region.

[5] The duration of this contingency period adds two non-contiguous periods of contingency: the January Strikes, the End of the First World War, and the German Revolution events (January 1918-May 1919); and the Kapp Putsch and the Ruhr Insurrection (March-April 1920).

Narrative Sequences:	January 1918 Strikes; First World War Defeat; Downfall of Second Reich events and German Revolution Events; Kapp Putsch ad Ruhr Uprising.
Government Falls:	Von Baden I; Council of People's Deputies; Scheidemann I ; Bauer I; Müller I.

Selected Bibliography:

Angress, Werner. 1957. "Weimar Coalition and Ruhr Insurrection, March-April 1920: A Study of Government Policy." *The Journal of Modern History*. 29(1): 1-20.

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1923. Reparation Crises
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	10 months.
Peak Beginning:	January 1923: Allied forces invade the Ruhr region as a way to extract reparations from World War I.
Peak End:	November 1923. Members of the National Socialist Party stag a failed coup against the Federal government in Munich.
Narrative Sequences:	Ruhr Occupation, Passive Resistance and Cuno Strikes; Von Kahr's Bavarian State Commission; Hamburg Uprising and Federal Interventions in Saxony and Thuringia; Küstrin Coup; Munich Coup.
Government Falls:	Cuno I; Stressemann I.

Selected Bibliography:

Angress, Werner. 1963. *Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921-1923*. Princeton: Princeton University.

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1930. Federal Election Results
(Elections)

Duration:	3 months.
Peak Beginning:	July 1930: Responding to a parliamentary overruling of an economic decree from Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, President Paul Von Hindenburg dissolves the Parliament and calls for general elections.
Peak End:	September 1930: Featuring a record turnout, the general election results elections dramatically increases the vote share of the National Socialist and the Communist Parties.
Narrative Sequences:	Brüning Government Crises.
Government Falls:	Müller I.

Selected Bibliography:

Falter, Jürgen. 1992. "The Social Bases of Political Cleavages in the Weimar Republic, 1919-1933." Pp. 371-398 in *Elections, Mass Politics and Social Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives,* edited by Larry Eugene Jones and James Retallack. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

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Pollock, James. 1932. *Money and Politics Abroad.* New York: AA Knopf.

1932. Weimar Downfall Events
(Political Crisis)

Duration:	10 months
Peak Beginning:	June 1932: President Von Hindenburg retires his support to Chancellor Brüning, who had begun to take independent positions regarding agricultural policies and paramilitary Nazi organizations.
Peak End:	February 1933: After his appointment as Chancellor and the eruption of a fire in the Reichstag, Adolf Hitler suspends civil and political liberties and calls for new general elections, which take place under an increasingly overt coercive environment.
Narrative Sequences:	National Concentration Cabinet Crises and Hitler's Arrival to Power; Reichstag Fire; Nazi Enabling Acts.
Government Falls:	Brüning I, Von Pappen I, Schleicher I.

Selected Bibliography:

Braatz, Werner. 1973. "Franz von Papen and the Preussenschlag, 20 July 1932: a move by the 'New State' towards Reichsreform." *European History Quarterly,* 3(2): 157-180.
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Turner, Henry Ashby. 1996. *Hitler's Thirty Days to Power*. Boston: Addison-Wesley.

1948. Western German Unification and Establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (Political Crisis)

Duration:

Peak Beginning:	June 1948: Currency reform in the three Western German occupation zones and launch of the Deutsche Mark.
Peak End:	August 1949: First Postwar German General Election. Konrad Adenauer is elected Chancellor of the German Federal Republic by a one-vote difference.
Narrative Sequences:	Reconstitution of German Statehood; 1948 Berlin Crisis.
Government Falls:	Allied Occupation.

Selected Bibliography:

Friedrich, Charles. 1949. "Rebuilding the German Constitution." *American Political Science Review* 43(3): 461-482.
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Woods Eisenberg, Carolyn. 1996. *Drawing the Line. The American Decision to Divide Geremany, 1944-1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
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1961-1962. Berlin Crisis, Der Spiegel Affair.
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	5 months[6]
Peak Beginning:	June 61: Walter Ulbricht, the chairman of the German Democratic Republic, announces the closure of the border between East and West Berlin.
Peak End:	November 62: The German Liberal abandons the governing coalition in protest against the government's intervention in the *Der Spiegel* magazine after the publication of a critical report against the state of the German Army. The liberal-demochristian coalition is reconstituted once Adenauer commits to resign as Chancellor by the end of 1963.
Narrative Sequences:	Partition of Berlin; *Der Spiegel* Civil Rights Affair.
Government Falls:	Adenuaer IV.

Selected Bibliography:

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Trauschweizer, Ingo. 2006. "Tanks at Checkpoint Charlie: Lucius Clay and the Berlin Crisis." *Cold War History* 6(2): 205-228.

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Der Spiegel, "Spiegel-Aktion: Sie kamen in der Nacht." November 11. 55-85.

Der Spiegel, 1962. Issues 45, 46, 47 and 48.

1967-1968. Extra-parliamentary Opposition (APO) Protests.
(Protests)

Duration:	9 months.[7]

[6] The duration of this contingency period adds two non-contiguous periods of contingency: the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the erection of the Berlin Wall (August-October 1961), and the *Spiegel* Affair (October-November 1962).

[7] The duration figure adds the 1967 (June-September) and 1968 (February-June) waves of student protests.

Peak Beginning:	June 1967: Clashes between police and left-wing students protesting against the visit of Iran's Shah to Germany lead to the death of a demonstrator.
Peak End:	The German Parliament passes the Emergency Law, which introduces a figure of emergency state to allow the German state to act in situations of emergency. The Law had become increasingly contested by student demonstrations throughout the year.
Narrative Sequences:	APO Opposition, First Wave (1961); Emergency Law Protest Wave; Murder Attempt against Rudi Dutschke.
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Burns, Rob, and Wilfried van der Will. 1999. *Protest and Democracy in West Germany*. London: McMillan: 99-124.

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Vazansky, Alexander, and Marco Abel. 2014. "Introduction: what was politics in '1968' in West Germany?" *The Sixties* 7(2): 83-98.

1972. Rote Armée Fraktion (RAF) Spring Terrorist Acts, *Ostpolitik* Crises
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	8 months.
Peak Beginning:	April 1972: Rainer Barzel, the chairman of the German demochristian party (CDU/CSU) fails to win a motion of no confidence against Chancellor Willy Brandt.
Peak End:	November 1972: Chancellor Willy Brand wins the snap general election and re-attains a working majority in the German Parliament.
Narrative Sequences:	"Barzel's Coup", minority Government, and November Anticipated Elections; RAF Spring Terrorist Acts; Munich Terrorist Acts.
Government Falls:	Brandt I.

Selected Bibliography:

Della Porta, Donatella. 1995. *Social Movements, Violence, and the State. A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge: University.

Grau, Andreas. 2009. "Auf der Suche nach den fehlenden Stimmen 1972. Zu den Nachwirkungen des gescheiterten Misstrauensvotums Barzel/Brandt.". *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 16(1): 1-17.
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1977. RAF Red Autumn
(Terrorist Act)

Duration:	7 months.
Peak Beginning:	April 1977: Murder of Attorney General Sigfried Buback by RAF members in retaliation for the conviction of the founding members of the terrorist organization.
Peak End:	October 1977: RAF members end the kidnapping of an airplane and kill Hanns Martin Schleyer, the president of the German Business Federation, after failing to obtain the release of RAF founding members, who commit suicide while serving sentences in the Stammheim prison.
Narrative Sequences:	Stammheim trial against RAF members and "Red Autumn" Terrorist Acts
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Geiger, Tim. 2009. "Landshut in Mogadischu. Das außenpolitische Krisenmanagement der Bundesregierung angesichts der terroristischen Herausforderung 1977." *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 57(3): 413-456.
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Von Stetten, Morizt. 2009. "Recent Literature on the Red Army Faction in Germany: A Critical Overview." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2(3): 546-554.
Wunschik, Tobias. 1997. *Baader-Meinhofs Kinder. Die Zweite Generation der RAF.* Berlin: Springer.

1981: Peace Protests, Corruption Scandals.
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	5 months
Peak Beginning:	October 1981: 250,000 people attend a demonstration in Bonn against the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe.
Peak End:	February 1982: *Der Spiegel* publishes the news over widespread mismanagement of *Neue Heimat,* a real estate corporation owned by German unions. The revelations act as a left-wing counterpart to the the scandal on the kickbacks given by the Flick corporation to West Germany's demochristian party, which has been published three months before.
Narrative Sequences:	First Peace Campaign; Flick Party Donation Affair; Neue Heimat Scandal.
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Becker-Schaum, Christoph, Philipp Gassert, Martin Klimke, Wilfried Mausbach, and Marianne Zepp. 2016. *The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s.* New York: Berghahn.
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Tompkins, Andrew. 2016, *Better Active than Radioactive*! *Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University.
Winkler, Heinrich August. 2007. *Germany, the Long Road West. Volume 2: 1933-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University.

Newspaper and Newsweekly Sources.
Der Spiegel, news on Peace March and Anti-Nuclear Movement, 1981-1982

Suggested articles include:
Der Spiegel. 1982." 'Die öffentliche Wirkung ist verheerend' ." *Der Spiegel,* March 1, 19-25.
Der Spiegel. 1982. "Gut getarnt im Dickicht der Firmen." *Der Spiegel,* February 8, 92-104; and Der Spiegel. "Vietor und die 'sogenannten reichen Leute'. " *Der Spiegel.* February 15, 1982, 98-104
Der Spiegel. 1983. "Der Schein der weißen Westen". *Der Spiegel*, November 29*,* 25-30.
Der Spiegel. 1983. " 'Zumindest stillschweigend bereit gezeigt' ", December 12, 21-26.
Der Spiegel. 1983. " 'Eine Zumutung für das Parlament'". *Der Spiegel.* August 22, 16-17.

1983: Events from the Wende Period
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	14 months.[8]
Peak Beginning:	September 1982: Helmut Schmidt is ousted from the Chancellorship after the Liberal Party leaves the governing coalition and supports a vote of no confidence that installs Demochristian Helmut Kohl in Germany's Chancellorship.
Peak End:	November 1983: The German Parliament agrees to the installment of Nuclear Missiles in German Soil, going against the demands of the hugely successful demonstrations of the Nuclear Action Week that had requested its rejection one month earlier.
Narrative Sequences:	Schmidt Downfall and 1983 General Election; Flick Parliamentary Inquiry Commission; Second Peace March.
Government Falls:	Schmidt III.

Selected Bibliography:
Rose, Clive. 1985. *Campaigns against Western Defence. NATO's adversaries and critics.* London: MacMillan.

[8] The duration estimate adds two non-contiguous periods of contingency: the political and electoral process that installed Helmut Kohl as chancellor (September 1982-March 1983) and the installation of the Flick Parliamentary Inquiry Commission and the organization Nuclear Action Week against the deployment of nuclear weapons (May-November 1983).

Geiger, Tim, and Jan Hansen. 2000. "Did Protest Matter? The Influence of the Peace Movement on the West German Movement and the Social Democratic Party, 1977-1983." Pp. 290-313 in *Nuclear Threats, Nuclear Fear and the Cold War of the 1980s.* Edited by Eckart Conze, Martin Klimke, and Jeremy Varon. Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Koopmans, Ruud. 1993. "The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989". *American Sociological Review* 58(5): 637-658.

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Winkler, Heinrich August. 2007. *Germany, the Long Road West. Volume 2: 1933-1990.* Oxford: Oxford University. Chapter 4.

Newspaper and Newsweekly Sources.

Der Spiegel, news on Peace March and Anti-Nuclear Movement, 1983

1990: Reunification
(Political event)

Duration:	14 months.
Peak Beginning:	November 1989: The Berlin Wall opens and the Communist government in East Germany dissolves due to economic crises, Eastern Germans' migration westward, and huge demonstrations against the political apparatus of the Communist Party.
Peak End:	The first postwar all-German elections take place.
Narrative Sequences:	German Reunification.
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Bozo, Frédéric, Andreas Rödder, and Mary Elise Sarotte, eds. 2017. *German Reunification: a Multinational History.* London. Routledge.

Koelble, Thomas. 1991. "After the Deluge: Unification and the Political Parties in Germany." *German Politics and Society* 22: 45-59.

Küsters, H. 2002. "The Kohl-Gorbachev Meetings in Moscow and the Caucasus, 1990." *Cold War History* 2(2): 195-235.

Merkl, Peter. 1993. *German Unification in the European Context.* University: Park: Penn State University Press.

Spohr, Kristina. 2000. "German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs". *The Historical Journal* 43(3): 869-888.

Newspaper and Newsweekly Sources.

Der Spiegel, news on GDR protests, Reunification, and General election, 1989-1990.

2000. CDU Financing Scandal
(Scandal)

Duration:	6 months.
Peak Beginning:	November 1999: Walther Leisler Kiep, a former CDU treasurer, is detained in connection to investigations related to corrupt practices in the financing of the German demochristian party.
Peak End:	April 2000: Angela Merkel is elected chairwoman of the CDU after Wolfgang Schreiber, its former chairman and a protegé of the former chancellor Helmut Kohl, is force to resign due to the investigations into in the financing practices of the CDU.
Narrative Sequences:	CDU Illegal Financing Scandal
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Clemens, Clay. 2005. "A Few Bad Apples or a Spoiled Barrel? The CDU Party Finance Scandal Five Years Later." *German Politics & Society* 23(2): 72-87.

Clemens, Clay. 2000. "Crisis or Catharsis? Germany's CDU After the Party Finance Affair." *German Politics and Society* 18(2): 66-90.

Clemens, Clay. 2000. "A Legacy Reassessed: Helmut Kohl and the German Party Finance Affair." *German Politics* 9(2): 25-50.

Helms, Ludger. 2000. "Is There Life After Kohl?" The CDU Crisis and the Future of Party Democracy in Germany." *Government and Opposition* 35(4): 419-438.

Von Alemann, Ulrich. 2002. "Party Finance, Party Donations and Corruption. The German Case." Pp. 102-116 in *Corrupt Exchanges: Empirical Themes in the Politics and Political Economy Corruption,* edited by Donatella Della Porta and S. Rose Ackerman. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Newspaper and Newsweekly Sources.

Der Spiegel, news on the CDU Finance Scandal, 1999-2000.

Italy

Italy features thirteen years when historical events occurred. They begin with the strike waves, social protests, electoral shocks, and generalized acts of violence that affected Italy between 1918 and 1919, commonly known as the *Biennio Rosso.* They continue with the Legalitarian Strike, the March on Rome, and Mussolini's arrival to power in 1922; the 1948

General Election Campaign, the murder attempt against Palmiro Togliatti, and the Labor Strikes this instance of political violence triggered; the student mobilizations and labor strikes of 1968 and 1969, and the *Autunno Caldo* strike wave and the Piazza Fontana Terrorist attack, which occurred in 1969 and continued into 1970; the Lockheed Scandal of 1976 and 1977, the wave of social violence and contestation of 1977, and the kidnap and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978; the Bologna Station Attack and the Donat Cattin terrorism scandal of 1980; and the years between 1992 and 1993, which witnessed the *Mani* Pulite corruption scandals, major terrorist attacks and political murders orchestrated by the Mafia, and the dissolution of the postwar political party system, and the arrival to power of media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi.

1918-1920. End of First World War and events from the *Biennio Rosso* Period
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	33 months.
Peak Beginning:	January 1918: Last year of First World War
Peak End:	December 1920: Italian army evicts the Italian expeditionary force occupying the Yugoslav city of Rijeka.
Narrative Sequences:	End of the First World War; *Biennio Rosso* strikes and factory occupations; fascists squad violence and Palazzo Accursio Massacre; Fiume/Rijeka occupation crises; Ancona munity; Electoral Results of the 1919 General Election.
Government Falls:	Orlando I; Nitti I; Nitti II.

Selected Bibliography:

Alatri, Paolo. 1976. *Nitti, D'Annunzio e la questione adriatica.* Milan: Feltrinelli

Cioffi, Marco. 2007. "24 Maggio 1920. L'eccidio di via Nazionale". *Dimensioni e problemi della ricerca storica* 1: 93-111.

Foot, John. 1997. "Analysis of a defeat: Revolution and Worker-Peasant Alliances in Italy, 1919-20." *Labour History Review* 64(2): 159-178.

Franzosi, Roberto. 1999. "The Return of the Actor. Interaction Networks among Social Actors During Periods of High Mobilization." in *Mobilization: An International Journal*

Giacomini, Ruggero. 2010. *La rivolta dei bersaglieri e le Giornate Rosse – I moti di Ancona dell'estate del 1920 e l'indipendenza dell'Albania.* Ancona: Assemblea legislativa delle Marche.

Musso, Stefano. 1992. "Political Tension and Labor Union Struggle: Working Class Conflicts in Turin during and after the First World War." Pp. 213-247 in *Strikes, Social Conflict, and the First World War,* edited by Leopold Haimson and Giulio Sapelli. Milan: Feltrinelli.
Onofri, Nazario. 1980. *La Strage di Palazzo Accursio: origine e nascita del fascismo bolognese 1919-1920*. Milan: Feltrinelli.
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Squeri, Lawrence. 1983. "The Italian Local Elections of 1920 and the Outbreak of Fascism." *The Historian* 45(3): 324-336.
Vivarelli, Roberto. 1991. *Storia delle origini del fascismo. L'Italia dalla grande guerra alla marcia su Roma*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Zamagni, Vera. 1991. "Industrial Wages and Workers' Protest in Italy during the 'Biennio Rosso. 1919-1920." *Journal of European Economic History* 20(1): 137-153.

1922. Legalitarian Strike and March on Rome
(Political Crisis)

Duration:	4 months.
Peak Beginning:	July 1922: Organization of the Antifascist Legalitarian Strikes by the Labor Alliance
Peak End:	October 1922: Naples Fascist Congress, and March on Rome, and appointment of Benito Mussolini as Prime Minister by king Vittorio Emanuele.
Narrative Sequences:	Legalitarian antifascist Strike, Fascist March on Rome, and Appointment of Mussolini as prime minister
Government Falls:	Bonomi I; Facta I; Facta II.

Selected Bibliography:

Brustein, William. 1991. "The 'Red Menace' and the Rise of Italian Fascism." *American Sociological Review* 56(1): 652-664.
Franzosi, Roberto. 1999. "The Return of the Actor. Interaction Networks among Social Actors During Periods of High Mobilization." *Mobilization* 4(2): 131-149.
Gentile, Emilio. 2012. *E fu subito regime. Il Fascismo e la marcia su Roma*. Bari: Laterza.
Morgan, Philip. 2003. *Italian Fascism, 1915-1945*. London: Palgrave.

1948. General Election, Togliatti Strikes
(Elections)

Duration:	6 months.
Peak Beginning:	February 1948: The Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its republican and socialist allies obtain 79% of the vote share in the Pescara administrative elections.
Peak End:	July 1948: A murder attempt against Palmiro Togliatti, the PCI chairman, triggers massive strike waves in the aftermath of the first postwar general election, won by Demochristian Alcide de Gasperi after a campaign marked by fears or hopes of a communist victory.
Narrative Sequences:	1948 General Election Campaign and Results; Murder Attempt against Palmiro Togliatti; Summer Strikes
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Behan, Thomas. 1996. " 'Going Further': The Aborted Italian Insurrection of 1948." *Left History* 3(2): 169-203.

Behan, Thomas. 1990. " 'Riding the Tiger': The Italian Communist Party and the Working Class of the Porta Romana Area of Milan, 1943-1948." *The Italianist* 10(1): 111-150.

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Ventresca, Robert. 2004. *From Fascism to Democracy: Culture and Politics in the Italian Election of 1948*. Toronto: University of Toronto.

1968-1970. Events of the *Maggio Strisciante* Period and aftermath
(Protests)

Duration:	34 months.[9]
Peak Beginning:	November 1967: Student occupations of universities, which had occurred sparsely throughout the year, begin to multiply across Italy and stage sit-ins in major higher education institutions like the Catholic University of Milan and the University of Turin.
Peak End:	July 1970: Riots in Reggio Calabria and killing of protesters in Gioia Tauro.

[9] The estimate adds two non-contiguous periods of contingency: the 68/69 episodes of student protest, workers mobilizations, and social violence (November 1967-December 1969), and the violence acts of Reggio and Gioia Tauro.

Narrative Sequences:	*Sessantotto* Student Mobilizations; 1968 Workers' Strikes; Catholic Dissidence Mobilizations; 1969 Social Contestation; *Autunno Caldo;* Piazza Fontana Terrorist Attacks; Fatti di Reggio and Gioia Tauro Violence Episodes.
Government Falls:	Moro III; Leone; Rumor I; Rumor II; Rumor III.

Selected Bibliography:

Breccia, Alessandro, ed. 2013. *Le istituzioni universitarie e il Sessantotto.* Bologna: CLUEB.

Franzosi, Roberto. 1995. *The Puzzle of Strikes.* Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Giachetti, Diego. 2013. *L'autunno caldo.* Roma: Ediesse.

Ghezzi, Carlo. 2010. *Piazza Fontana. Ora e sempre in difesa della democrazia.* Roma: Ediesse.

Hilwig, Stuart. 2009. *Italy and 1968. Youthful Unrest and Democratic Culture.* New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Lavagna, Gavina. 2017. "I primi tre governi Rumor, dopo il governo Leone: governi di coalizione e governi di attesa." *Federalismi.it* (13): 1-20.

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Raja, Roberto. 2017. *Il 68 giorno per giorno.* Florence: Clichy.

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Tolomelli, Marica. 2008. *Il Sessantotto: una breve storia.* Rome: Carocci.

1976-1978. Events of the *Anni di Piombo* period
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	22 months
Peak Beginning:	March 1976: News on kickbacks received by Italian politician from Lockheed to secure military contracts start to be published in the press.
Peak End:	May 1978: former Prime Minister Aldo Moro is murdered by terrorists after a three month-long kidnap period.
Narrative Sequences:	Lockheed Scandal and Parliamentary Inquiry Commission; 1976 General Election; *Movimento del '77* and Social Contestation; *Brigate Rose* Terrorist Acts; Kidnap and Murder of Aldo Moro.
Government Falls:	Moro IV; Moro V.

Selected Bibliography:

Balestrini, Nanni, and Primo Moroni. 2015. *L'orda d'oro. 1968-1977: la grande ondata rivoluzionaria e creativa, politica ed esistenziali.* Milan: Feltrinelli.
Barbagallo, Francesco. 2004. "Enrico Berlinguer, Il compromesso storico e l'alternativa democratica." *Studi Storici* 45(4): 939-949.
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Caprara, Maurizio. 2001. "Il caso Lockheed in Parlamento." Pp. 1127-1154 in *Storia d'Italia, Annali 17. Il Parlamento,* edited by L. Violante. Turin: Eunadi.
Clark, Martin, and R.E.M. Irving. 1977. "The Italian General Elections of June 1976: Towards a "historic compromise?" *Parliamentary Affairs* 30(1): 7-34.
Gagliardi, Alessio. 2017. " 'Stagione dei movimenti' e 'anni di piombo'? Storia e storiografia dell'Italia degli anni settanta." *Storica* 67-68: 83-129.
Giovagnoli, Agostino. 2005. *Il caso Moro: una tragedia repubblicana.* Bologna: Il Mulino.
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Satta, Vladimiro. 2018. "Le legislazione premiale antiterrorismo in Italia. Dalla vicenda Moro alla fine degli 'anni di piombo'." *Mondo Contemporaneo* (1): 5-34.
Wagner-Pacifici, Robin. 1983. "Negotiation in the Aldo Moro Affair: The Suppressed Alternative in a Case of Symbolic Politics." *Politics and Society* 12(4): 487-517.
Zanelli, Dario. 1978. *Scandali Politici e Caso Lockheed.* Bologna: Capitol.

1980. Bologna Station Attack, Donat-Cattin Affair.
(Terrorism)

Duration:	4 months.
Peak Beginning:	May 1980: The son of Carlo Donat-Cattin, a prominent Demochristian politician is accused by the police of forming part of the *Prima Linea* terrorist organization.
Peak End:	August 1980:
Narrative Sequences:	Bologna Station Attack; Itavia Plane Crash; Donat-Cattin Affair.
Government Falls:	Cossiga II.

Selected Bibliography:

Galfré, Monica. 2014. La guerra è finita. L'Italia e l'uscita dal terrorismo 1980-1987. Bari: Laterza.

Garner, Lawrence, and Roberta Garner. 1981. "Italy: Crisis as Routine." *Current History:* 209-2012.

Licciardi, Gabriele. 2020. "La rivoluzione è finita, la Guerra continua. Carceri, pentiti e dissociate 1980-1987." *Meridiana* 97: 105-22.

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1992-1994. Events from the Dissolution of the 'First Republic' Period
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	27 months.
Peak Beginning:	February 1992. Mario Chiesa, a socialist politician from Milan, is detained by investigative judge Antonio di Pietro in connection to an investigation on political corruption.
Peak End:	March 1994. Media Tycoon Silvio Berlusconi wins the 1994 anticipated general election.
Narrative Sequences:	*Mani Pulite* Corruption Inquiry, *Tangentopoli* scandals, Enimont investigation and Cusani Trial; Dissolution of Postwar Political Party System; Lima, Falcone and Borsellino Murders; Mafia Terrorist Attacks; Berlusconi's *Discesa in Campo* and Electoral Victory
Government Falls:	Andreotti VII; Cossiga Presidency; Amato I; Ciampi I; Berlusconi I.

Selected Bibliography:

Adesso, Maria Serena, and Vicenzo Neve. 2011. "Ricordando la 'discesa in campo.' Cenni sull'uso politico della storia nell'Italia del Cavaliere (1994-1996)." *Historia Magistra* 3(6): 37-49.

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Della Porta, Donatella, and Alberto Vannucci. 1999. *Un paese anormale. Come la classe politica ha perso l'occasione di mani pulite*. Bari: Laterza.

Feltri, Mettia. 2016. *Novantatré. L'anno del terrore di Mani pulite*. Venice: Marsilio.

Gundle, Stephen, and Simon Parker, eds. 1996. *The New Italian Republic. From The Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi*. London: Routledge.

Katz, Richard, and Piero Ignazi, eds. 1996. *Italian Politics: The Year of the Tycoon*. London: Routledge.
La Licata, Francesco. 2002. *Storia di Giovanni Falcone.* Milan: Feltrinelli.
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Rhodes, Martin. 1997. "Financing party politics in Italy: A case of systemic corruption." *West European Politics* 20(1): 54-79.
Sberna, Salvatore, and Alverto Vannucci. 2013. " 'It's the politics, stupid'. The politicization of anti-corruption in Italy." *Crime, Law, and Social Change* (60): 565-593.
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Netherlands

The Netherlands features nine events in five different years. The firsts are the mutiny of Indonesian and Dutch sailors in the *Die Zeven Provinciën* ship of 1933 and the 1934 riot in the Jordaan neighborhood of Amsterdam; the political crises provoked by the Indonesian independence war in 1946 (the passage of Linggajatti Agreements and Conscription Protests; and the First and Second Indonesian Police Actions of 1947 and 1948; the 1976 Lockheed Corruption Scandal, and the 1977 Moluccan Terrorist Crisis of Glimmen and the Government Formation Grid crises of 1977; the Social Protests and the Political Strains provoked by the deployment of NATO Euromisiles in Europe in 1981, and the Second Peace March and arrival to power of Ruud Lubbers and the implantation of neoliberal policies in 1983.

1933-1934. De Zeven Provinciën Mutiny, Jordaan Riot
(Protests)

Duration:	4 months.[10]
Peak Beginning:	February 1933: Mutiny of Dutch and Indonesian Sailors in the *De Zeven Provinciën* battleship

[10] This duration figure adds two non-contiguous events: The mutiny of the *Die Zeven Provinciën* ship (February-April 1933); and the Jordaan Riots of July 1934.

Peak End:	July 1934: Riot in the Jordaan working-class neighborhood of Amsterdam erupt after the government of Hendrijk Coljin decides to reduce unemployment benefits.
Narrative Sequences:	Mutiny of the *De Zeven Provinciën* battleship; Jordaan Riots.
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Blom, Johan. 2005. *De muiterij op de Zeven Provinciën: Reacties en Gevolgen in Nederland.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University.

De Vries, Tity. 2010. "Barricaden, marechaussees en een zonnescherm. Het Jordaanoproer van 1934." *Groniek* 187: 141-156.

Hansen, Erik. 1977. "The Dutch Indies and the Reorientation of Dutch Social Democracy, 1929-1940." *Indonesia* 23: 59-85.

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Kielich, Wolf. 1984. *Jordaners op de barricaden: het oproer van 1934*. Zutphen: Walburg.

1946-1948. Indonesian Crises.
(Political Crises)

Duration:	18 months.[11]
Peak Beginning:	May 1946: the Dutch parliament votes a constitutional making military conscription compulsory to fight Indonesian independentists.
Peak End:	December 1948: The Dutch government launches a second military "Police Action" in Indonesia to force independentist to agree to their conditions for granting independence to its former colony. After widespread international condemnation, the Netherlands declares a unilateral ceasefire on December 31.
Narrative Sequences:	Resistance Acts Against Conscription; Signature of Linggajatti Agreements; First Java Police Action; Second Java Police Action and Indonesian Retreat.
Government Falls:	Beel I.

Selected Bibliography:

Anderson, Benedict. 1972. *Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946*. Ithaca: Cornell University.

[11] The duration of this contingency period adds three non-contiguous periods of contingency: the Signature of the Lingajjatti Agreements and the staging of Conscription Protests (May-Dec 1946), the launching of the First Java Police Action (March-July 1947), and the organization of the Second Java Police Action (July-December 1948).

De Jong, L. 1988. *Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Part 12. Epiloog.* Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.
Stevens, R.J.. 1996. "Een (buiten) parlementaire lobby: het Nationaal Comité Handhaving Rijkseenheid 1946-1950." *Politieke Opstellen* 15-16: 113-136.
Vickers, Adrian. 2005. *A History of Modern Indonesia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University.

1976-1977. Lockheed Affair, Moluccan Terrorism, Government Formation Crises
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	16 months.[12]
Peak Beginning:	December 1975: Moluccan independentists take train passengers as hostages near the town of Wijster.
Peak End:	December 1977: Demochristian Dries Van Agt is sworn in as prime minister after more than six months of absence of government due to gridlock regarding government formation.
Narrative Sequences:	Wijster Hostage Crisis; Lockheed Corruption Scandal; Glimmen Hostage Crisis; Government Formation Political Crisis.
Government Falls:	Den Uyl I.

Selected Bibliography:

Aalders, Gerard. 2011. *Het Lockheed schandaal. Wapenindustrie, smeergeld & corruptie.* Amsterdam: Boom.
Andere Tijden. 2002. "Onder onwezenlijke omstandigheden. De verkiezingsdag in 1977". *Andere Tijden.* Accessed on July 7, 2020 at https://www.anderetijden.nl/aflevering/545/Onder-onwezenlijke-omstandigheden.
Fijnot, Cyrille. 1992. "Political Violence and the Police Response in the Netherlands". *Conflict Quarterly* 12(4): 57-66.
Hellema, Duco. 2012. *Nederland en de jaren zeventig.* Amsterdam: Boom. Chapters 5 and 6.
Herman, Valentine, and Rob van der Laan Bouma. 1980. "Nationalists Without a Nation: South Moluccan Terrorism in the Netherlands." *Terrorism* 4(1-4): 223-257.
Kroeze, Ronald. 2017. "Lockheed (1977) and Flick (1981-1986): Anticorruption as a Pragmatic Practice in the Netherlands and Germany." Pp. 279-291 in *Anticorruption in History: From Antiquity to the Modern Era,* edited by Ronald Kroeze, André Vitória and G. Geltner. Oxford: Oxford University.
Rasser, Martijn. 2005. "The Dutch Response to Moluccan Terrorism, 1970-1978." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28(6): 481-492.
Van Mierlo, Hans. "The 1981 Netherlands Election." *West European Politics* 4(3): *297-301.*
Zonneveld, M. 1992. " De rol van het CDA in de kabinetformatie van 1977." *Jaerboek DNPP:* 119-138.

[12] The duration of this contingency period adds three non-contiguous periods of contingency: the Wijster train hostage crisis (December 1976); the Lockheed corruption scandal (February-August 1976); and the 1976 Glimmen train hostage crisis and the government formation gridlock (May-December 1977).

Van den Brock, I.M. 1999. "De Partij van de Arbeid en het kabinet-Den Uyl." *Jaerboek DNPP:* 216-238.

1981. Euromissile Dissensus
(Protests)

Duration:	7 months.
Peak Beginning:	May 1981: The results of the General Election make necessary the formation of a Grand Coalition between Socialists that prevents adopting a final resolution on the Netherlands' participation in NATO's nuclear Euromissiles program.
Peak End:	November 1981: 350,000 people assemble in Amsterdam to reject the deployment of nuclear missiles in the Netherlands. After the demonstration the newly constituted Dutch government suspends indefinitely its decision to participate in the program.
Narrative Sequence:	Anti-Nuclear Weapons Campaign.
Government Falls:	None.

Selected Bibliography:

Everts, Philip. 1985. *Controversies at Home: Domestic Factors in the Foreign Policy of the Netherlands.* Amsterdam : Martinus Nijhoff.

Kaarbo, Juliet. 2012. *Coalition Politics and Cabinet Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Choices*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Chapter 7.

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1983. *Keerpunt* and Second Peace March
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	13 months.
Peak Beginning:	October 1982: Prime Minister Dries Van Agt surprisingly resigns citing personal issues, and endorses the bid of Ruud Lubbers, the Demochristian parliamentary speaker, to succeed him.
Peak End:	November 1983: A Second "Peace March" is organized to protest the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands. Approximately 3% of the country's population participate in it.
Narrative Sequences:	*Keerpunt* policy changes; Second Peace March
Government Falls:	Van Agt III.

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APPENDIX C

Generation of cohort size and cohort education variables

Theoretically, including *cohort size* and *cohort education* as independent variables required assigning to each cohort under analysis a time-invariant value capturing potential long-term influences related to the size and educational attainment of a generation, even if natural attrition and late educational enrollment meant that the cohort values of these variables changed over time. Practically speaking, on the other hand, it demanded the construction of two full, internally consistent series of data for 80 different cohorts. There are no readily-available data series to measure the size or the level of educational attainment for the 80 cohorts of the 5 countries I analyze. I constructed this series using a variety of historical statistical sources that allowed me to produce minimally consistent measures of cohort size and educational attainment for these cohorts. The paragraphs below discuss how I used these sources to construct indicators of cohort size and cohort educational attainment.

Cohort size

A full theoretical discussion of how cohort size relates to political talk still awaits elaboration. However, noting the particular importance that age/cohort homophily has for this behavior at young adulthood (see theoretical section), I contend that a theoretically relevant indicator of *cohort size* is related to how many coevals a person had available to interact with during young adulthood given that this might push up or down the number of potential political discussion partners she might have available. Based on this argument, the value of a respondent's *cohort size* was constructed in the following way:

(1)

$$cohort\ size_{i,j(i),k(i)} = \begin{array}{l}\text{number of people in country } k \text{ aged 20-25} \\ \text{when cohort } j \text{ was 23 years old}\end{array}$$

, where *i* refers to the *i*-th respondent of a survey, *j(*i) refers to her cohort membership, and *k(i)* to her country citizenship. I chose the age of 23 as a reference age because it is the median age of the 20 to 25 year-old age category.

The data I used to build this variable for cohorts up to 1950 was Mitchell's *European Historical Statistics* (1975). It provides country-level population data by 5-year age brackets for the years when a census was conducted (in general every 10 years). I assigned values for inter-censual years using linear imputations. From 1951 on, I used yearly data on country population compiled by the United Nations. Early census data from the countries under analysis (especially Belgium and Italy) include groups of people without age data. However, the volume of these age "non responses" was marginal and did not significantly alter estimated figures.

Most of the time these sources had direct data on the number of people aged 20 to 25. One exception was the data from Germany in 1939, which used a wide age category to report population data. In this case I imputed an estimate of the size of the 20-25 year old population, by weighting available pooled figures by the share of the population that people aged 20 to 25 occupied within this larger age category in the last year for which this data was available.

Frontier changes also challenged the comparability of data. However, relative to original country populations, changes in population resulting from border definitions were relatively small except for two cases. One was Germany at the end of the 1930s, when the National Socialist regime annexed Czechoslovakia and Austria. Due to the lack of data with which to weight 1939 population figures in Germany, I introduced this figure without

corrections. The other was again Germany after its partition at the end of the Second World War. After 1945, data on *cohort size* is based on population figures from West Germany. From 1951 onwards, these numbers were obtained using German Federal Republic Statistical s; in 1946, they came from Mitchell (1975). From 1947-1951, I used linear imputations using 1946 and 1951 figures.

Cohort Education

Keeping into account that educational attainment levels has been found to be one of the strongest predictors of political engagement, this variable sought to capture possible effects related to having a more or less educated pool of potential political talkers. Under the expectation that the effects of the size of this pool are larger during young adulthood, cohort education measures centered in measuring levels of higher education enrollment when a generation was entering young adulthood. I focused on this level of educational attainment because it is the one that has been found to have stronger effects in terms of political cognition, information, and the size of political interaction networks. More specifically, I used the following formula to build an indicator of *cohort education*:

(2)

$$\textit{cohort education}_{i,j(i),k(i)} = \frac{\text{number of university students in country } k \text{ at the year when cohort } j \text{ was 20 years old}}{\text{number of people aged 20-25 in country } k \text{ when cohort } j \text{ was 20 years old}}$$

, where i refers to respondent i, $j(i)$ refers to i's cohort membership, and $k(i)$ refers to her country citizenship. I chose age 20 as the age reference because it constitutes the typical median age for a higher education student. I chose the total number of students enrolled in

universities as a proxy for higher educational involvement because it was the only data on higher education available for the oldest cohorts. Due to the difficulty of obtaining figures about the numbers of people aged 18-22 from original data age categories, I chose 20 to 25 years old as the next best alternative.

Data related to the number of people aged 20 to 25 was obtained from the figures I used for calculating *cohort size*. Data related to the number of university students were obtained from two different sources. Up to 1970 I used Mitchell's historical statistics series, which provided direct figures of university students enrolled for each of the five countries under analysis. In years with missing data, values were imputed using linear estimations analogous to the ones I used for *cohort size* except when missing data was located in years of military conflict (this happened for Belgium in World War I, and for Germany and the Netherlands in World War II). In these cases, a linear imputation would not have been able to capture decreases of university students generated by full military mobilization. For this reason, estimates on the population of university students from war periods were imputed by weighting the size of this population in the last peaceful year by percentual changes in university enrollment over the war years relative to the last peaceful year *in countries with a roughly similar war involvement* and for which complete data series on the size of university students exist during war years. Thus, for Belgium in the First World War, an estimation of higher education students in 1915, for example, was obtained by multiplying the number of university students that Belgium had in 1914 by the percentage that the number of university students enrolled in France in that year represented relative to its university student body in 1914. For Germany in the Second World War, an analogue operation was made using the United Kingdom as a reference. For the Netherlands in the Second World War, the reference was Belgium.

For 1971 onwards, raw data comes from UNESCO estimates on the numbers of students enrolled in "tertiary education". This source was chosen because data on student enrollment in university, strictly speaking, stopped being reported after 1970. Since tertiary education is a broader category than a university education, I rescaled these figures to make it minimally consistent with *cohort education* figures drawn from information of earlier years.

An optimal rescaling procedure would have required knowing the proportion that university students represented out of the total mass of tertiary education students. While I was unable to locate systematic data on this proportion in France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, I was able to do so for the Federal German Republic and for unified Germany after 1989. I used these figures to calculate proxies for the size of university students elsewhere. A key assumption here is that patterns of higher education enrollment in the countries I analyzed are similar to Germany's. A priori, this does not seem to be a problematic assumption since all countries developed fairly extensive higher education systems after the Second World War. Nine data points lacked sufficient information to impute an estimate of university students using German information. In these cases, a linear imputation using the closest real values was used.

APPENDIX D1
META-ANALYTIC RESULTS FOR EVENT VARIABLES[1]

Variables	Ordinary Least Squares Model (1) Avg. Est. Coef.[3]	Ordinary Least Squares Model (2) *Signif. Rate*[4]	Ordered Logistic Model[2] (3) Signif. Rate[4]
Belgium			
1.— '18. End of First World War	-.0012	*.500*	.500
2.— '36. Black Sunday; Summer Strikes	-.0013***	*.806*	.819
3.— '39-'45. Second World War	.0000	*.028*	.028
4.— '50. Abdication of Léopold III	-.0005	*.417*	.625
5.— '55. Collard Law Protests	-.0001	*.236*	.194
6.— '60. Intervention in Congo; Winter Strikes	.0009	*.431*	.431
7.— '68. Leuven University Split Crises	.0005	*.514*	.556
8.— '78. Egmont Pact Breakdown	-.0010*	*.972***	.986***
9.— '80-'81. *Redressement* Events	.0012***	*1.000****	1.000***
10.—'83. Second Peace March	-.0004*	*.597*	.444
11.—'92. 2nd Black Sunday	.0007***	*1.000****	1.000***
12.—'95-'96. Agusta-Dassault/Dutroux Affairs	-.0002	*.097*	.083
France			
1.— '18. End of First World War	-.0004	*.278*	.333
2.— '34-'36. Popular Front formation events	-.0006	*.417*	.444
3.— '39-'45. Second World War	.0011	*.333*	.319
4.— '47. Unity Gov't Fall, November Strikes	.0000	*.167*	.167
5.— '54. Dien Bien Phu and aftermath	-.0010+	*.472*	.472
6.— '58. Algiers Putsch, Fifth Republic Est.	.0001	*.125*	.125
7.— '61-'62. Algerian Retreat Crises	.0000	*.236*	.250
8.— '68. Spring '68	.0004	*.417*	.375
9.— '81. Socialist Electoral Victories	.0008*	*.875**	.792
10.—'83. *Tournant de la Rigueur*	-.0017***	*1.000****	1.000***
West Germany			
1.— '18-'20. German Revolution Events	.0017***	*.903*	1.000
2.— '23. Reparation Crises	-.0004	*.153*	.222
3.— '30. Results of 1930 Federal Election	.0014	*.500*	.500
4.— '32-'33. Weimar Downfall Events	-.0008	*.292*	.292
5.— '39-'45. Second World War	.0024	*.569*	.597
6.— '48. Establishment of Federal Republic	.0003	*.250*	.250
7.— '61-'62. Berlin Crisis/Der Spiegel Affair	.0007+	*.583*	.750
8.— '67-'68. APO Protests	-.0005	*.417*	.417
9.— '72. RAF Terrorism, *Ostpolitik* Crises	.0007+	*.444*	.458
10.—'77. RAF Terrorism: Red Autumn	-.0006***	*1.000****	1.000***
11.—'81. Peace Protests, Corruption Scandals	.0020***	*1.000****	1.000***
12.—'83. *Die Wende* Events	-.0008***	*1.000****	1.000***
13.—'90. Reunification	.0007***	*1.000****	1.000***
14.—'00. CDU Financing Scandal	-.0005	*.500*	.500

APPENDIX D1 (CONT.)
META-ANALYTIC RESULTS FOR EVENT VARIABLES[1]

	Ordinary Least Squares Model		Ordered Logistic Model[2]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Avg. Est. Coef.[3]	*Signif. Rate*[4]	Signif. Rate[4]
Italy			
1.— '18-'20. *Biennio Rosso* Events.	.0020**	*.500*	.375
2.— '22. Legalitarian Strike/March on Rome . . .	-.0009	*.500*	.500
3.— '39-'45. Second World War	.0007	*.194*	.181
4.— '48. General Election, Strikes.	-.0004	*.194*	.167
5.— '68-'70. *Sessantotto* and *Autunno Caldo*	.0006*	*.556*	.556
6.— '76-'78. *Anni di Piombo* Events	.0005	*.931***	.917***
7.— '80. Bologna Station Attack.	-.0014*	*1.000***	1.000***
8.— '92-'94. Dissolution of First Rep. Events . . .	.0024***	*1.000***	1.000***
Netherlands			
1.— '33-'34. *DZP* Mutiny/ Jordaan Riot	.0001	*.056*	.056
2.— '39-'45. Second World War	.0002	*.028*	.028
3.— '46-'48. Indonesian Crises	.0005***	*.444*	.444
4.— '76-'77. Lockheed Affair / Glimmen Crisis .	.0012***	*1.000***	1.000***
5.— '81. Euromissile Dissensus	.0009***	*1.000***	1.000***
6.— '83. *Keerpunt* and Second Peace March	-.0012***	*1.000***	1.000***

Significance: ⁺0.1 level; * 0.05 level; ** 0.01 level; 0.001 level.
[1]Excludes war variables.
[2]Coefficients excluded from report due to their incomparability between models.
[3]Significance levels show if the distribution of values were unidirectional at stadard levels of confidence.
[4]Significance levels from Robut Significance Indicator: probability that of a variable being significant in at least 75% of models given observed sigificance rate.

APPENDIX D2
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS: ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS, INCOME AND EDUCATION[1]
OLS MODEL

	Ind. Controls		Income					Education			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Countries	Female	Married	Second lowest	Median	Second highest	Highest	Non Resp.	High School	Some College	College or more	Ongoing
1.— Belgium											
Estimated Coeff.[1]	-0.195***	0.007**	0.032***	0.113***	0.183***	0.078***	0.050***	0.151***	0.312***	0.446***	0.369***
Significance Rate[2]	*1.000***	*0.000*	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***
2.— France											
Estimated Coeff.	-0.147***	-0.027***	0.079***	0.167***	0.256***	0.255***	0.004+	0.182***	0.310***	0.455***	0.460***
Significance Rate	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	.000	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***
3.— W.Germany											
Estimated Coeff.	-0.208***	0.040***	-0.007+	0.036***	0.063***	0.083***	0.036***	0.112***	0.213***	0.306***	0.275***
Significance Rate	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000*	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***
4.— Italy											
Estimated Coeff.	-0.300***	-0.027***	0.061***	0.096***	0.157***	0.173***	0.260***	0.238***	0.297***	0.420***	0.402***
Significance Rate	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*.944***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***
5.— Netherlands											
Estimated Coeff.	-0.057***	0.037***	-0.172***	-0.051*	0.073**	0.131***	-0.080***	0.156***	0.278***	0.359***	0.389***
Significance Rate	*1.000***	*1.000*	*1.000***	.708	.347	*1.000*	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000***	*1.000*	*1.000***

Significance: +0.1 level; * 0.05 level; ** 0.01 level; 0.001 level.
[1] Significance levels show if the distribution of values were unidirectional at stadard levels of confidence.
[2] Significance levels from Robut Significance Indicator: probability that of a variable being significant in at least 75% of models, given observed significance rate.

APPENDIX D3
CROSS- REGRESSION RESULTS: ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR AGE, RESIDENCE AND PERIOD VARIABLES, AND CONSTANT[1]
OLS MODEL

	Age		Residence							Period		Cons.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Countries	Age	Age Sq.	Rural Residence	..... Regional Controls.						Election	GDP growth	
Belgium				*Flanders*	*Wallonia*							
Avg. Est. Coef	0.015***	-9.6e-5***	-0.027***	-0.082***	-0.023***	—	—	—	—	0.016***	0.031***	-0.032
Significance Rate.	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	—	—	—	—	*1.000*	*1.000*	*.486*
France				*North*	*NW*	*East*	*West*	*SW*	*SE*			
Avg. Est. Coef	0.016***	-1.5e-4***	-0.049***	-0.106***	-0.036***	-0.046***	-0.033***	-.0047***	-0.003	0.020***	0.106***	0.567
Significance Rate.	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*.763*
West Germany				*NW*	*SW*							
Avg. Est. Coef	-4.3e-5	-4.7e-5	-0.026***	0.021***	-2.1e-4	—	—	—	—	-6.6e-4	-0.008***	1.154***
Significance Rate.	*.333*	*.750*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*.000*	—	—	—	—	*.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*
Italy				*NE*	*Center*	*South*	*Islands*					
Avg. Est. Coef	0.023***	1.9e-4***	0.028***	0.008	0.022***	-0.034***	-0.021***	—	—	0.013**	-0.003	0.463
Significance Rate	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	—	—	*.916*	*.514*	*.500*
Netherlands				*West*	*East*	*South*						
Avg. Est. Coef	0.013***	1.3e-4***	-0.012**	-0.028***	0.014***	-0.049***	—	—	—	0.047***	-0.005***	0.511
Significance Rate.	*1.000*	*1.000*	*.930*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	—	—	—	*1.000*	*1.000*	*.777*

[1] Robust Significance Statistic (RSS) significance levels: +Significant at the .1 level; * Significant at the .05 level; **Significant at the 0.01 level; ***Significant at the .001 level

APPENDIX D4
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS: ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR COHORT-LEVEL CONTROLS[1]
OLS MODEL

Countries	(1) 1906-1910	(2) 1911-1915	(3) 1916-1920	(4) 1921-1925	(5) 1926-1930	(6) 1931-1935	(7) 1936-1940	(8) 1941-1945	(9) 1946-1950	(10) 1951-1955	(11) 1956-1960	(12) 1961-1965	(13) 1966-1970	(14) 1971-1975	(15) 1976-1980	(16) 1981-1985	(17) 1986-1987
Belgium																	
Avg. Est. Coef.	.078***	.130	.133	.083	.102	.052	.105	.175	.200	.247	.221	.150	.179	.167	.150	.041	-.033
Signficance Rate	*1.000*	*.750*	*.611*	*.167*	*.361*	*.111*	*.361*	*.056*	*.583*	*.694*	*.639*	*.361*	*.500*	*.389*	*.333*	*.139*	*.000*
France																	
Avg. Est. Coef.	.023	.125	.020	.040	.234	.221	.242	.239	.266	.289	.312	.292	.237	.263	.190	.055	-.159
Signficance Rate	*1.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.500*	*.500*	.528	*.500*	*.611*	*.722*	*.861*	*.694*	*.500*	*.611*	*.500*	*.583*	*.333*
West Germany																	
Avg. Est. Coef.	-.037	-.068	-.081	-.184***	.225	.211	.192	.160	.121	.090	.069	.028	.038	-.011	-.037	-.221	-.387
Signficance Rate	*1.000*	*.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	.250	*.250*	.250	*.250*	*.250*	*.278*	*.444*	*.417*	*.417*	*.333*	*.250*	*.5000*	*.500*
Italy																	
Avg. Est. Coef.	.081	.120	.153	.187	.289	.295	.331	.381**	.453**	.499**	.500**	.387	.250	.156	.185	.147	.203
Signficance Rate	*1.000*	*.000*	*.389*	*.389*	.667	*.667*	*.806*	*.944*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*1.000*	*.806*	*.638*	*.278*	*.306*	*.111*	*.056*
Netherlands																	
Avg. Est. Coef.	.013	.014	.042	.027	.054	.058	.080	.054	.002	.002	-.024	.001	.007	-1.58e-4	-.075	-.182	-.136
Signficance Rate	*1.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.000*	*.028*	*.111*	*.111*	*.333*	*.333*	*.333*

[1] Robust Significance Statistic (RSS) significance levels: [+]Significant at the .1 level; * Significant at the .05 level; **Significant at the 0.01 level; ***Significant at the .001 level